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Abstract 
 
 This paper reviews proposals that conscious perception consists, in whole or part, of 
successive discrete temporal frames on the sub-second time scale, each frame containing 
information registered as simultaneous or static. Although the idea of discrete frames in 
conscious perception cannot be regarded as falsified, there are many problems. Evidence 
does not consistently support any proposed duration or range of durations for frames. EEG 
waveforms provide evidence of periodicity in brain activity, but not necessarily in conscious 
perception. Temporal properties of perceptual processes are flexible in response to competing 
processing demands, which is hard to reconcile with the relative inflexibility of regular 
frames. There are also problems concerning the definition of frames, the need for 
informational connections between frames, the means by which boundaries between frames 
are established, and the apparent requirement for a storage buffer for information awaiting 
entry to the next frame. 
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Is conscious perception a series of discrete temporal frames? 
 
1: Introduction 
 
 Subjectively, conscious perception is smooth and continuous. Things move on from one 
moment to the next, and we perceive motion and all other forms of change (while they are going 
on) without any hint of discontinuity. Conscious percepts must have some level of temporal 
granularity, and that may be set by fundamental operating characteristics of neurons. That level 
of granularity could be far below the temporal resolution of perception, much as the level of 
granularity in a digital photograph, the pixel, is usually far below the resolution of the 
photograph that is detectable to the eye. The finest temporal resolution in perception is found in 
specialised processors such as echolocation mechanisms in bats and electric field fluctuation 
detectors in electric fish, which can detect temporal phenomena on the nanosecond time scale 
(Carr, 1993; Simmons, 1973, 1979). In humans, differences in arrival times of sound to the two 
ears can be resolved on a scale of microseconds (Grothe, 2003). There is no percept of temporal 
succession at that level, however. Instead, the percept is of spatial localisation of a single sound 
source, and this does not resolve into a percept of two successive sounds until the time difference 
is ~5 ms (Wallach, Newman, and Rosenzweig, 1949). This is an indication that the fundamental 
temporal resolution in conscious perception may be on the millisecond time scale but perhaps < 
10 ms. 
 Some authors, however, have proposed a level of temporal resolution in conscious 
percepts that is much coarser than that. In general terms, the proposal is that perceptual 
experience is packaged into discrete temporal frames on the sub-second scale, and that the 
apparent flow and continuity of perceptual experience over time is a superficial phenomenon that 
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is underlain by temporal discontinuity on a time scale of a substantial fraction of a second. The 
aim of the present paper is to review and assess such proposals. Table 1 sets out the structure of 
the review. 
 
1.1: What is a frame of conscious perception? 
 
 Most proposals have had little to say about how a frame should be defined, but it is 
possible to point to some general features that will suffice for the time being. A common feature 
of the definition of frames is that they mark a boundary between events that are perceived as 
simultaneous versus nonsimultaneous (e.g. Crick & Koch, 2003; Pöppel, 1997, 2009; VanRullen 
& Koch, 2003). Thus, all information within a given frame has experienced contemporaneity, 
and events can only be perceived as occurring at different times if they occur in different frames. 
This implies a certain level of co-ordination in perceptual processing: given that different 
processes are separate, both functionally and neuroanatomically, especially if they occur in 
different modalities, there must be some kind of process that effectively assigns their products to 
bins in a co-ordinated way, as the foundation for experienced contemporaneity. It is sometimes 
stated in addition that the partitioning of percepts into temporal frames is endogenous and not 
affected by times of occurrence of external events (Harter, 1967; Stroud, 1956; Ulrich, 1987). 
However, Haber and Hershenson (1973) proposed that a series of frames could be initiated by 
the onset of a stimulus and ended at the frame containing the termination of the stimulus. It is 
also sometimes argued that a frame represents an updating interval: in effect, frames represent 
the maintenance of information in a static representation, and a new frame starts when some 
process of frame construction or updating is completed (Kozma & Freeman, 2017; VanRullen, 
Zoefel, & Ilhan, 2014). 
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 The extreme form of the frame hypothesis is that there is just a single frame (at a time) 
that encompasses all of perception. This extreme form is hardly every encountered in the 
literature. It seems to be implied in Stroud's (1956) proposal of a psychological moment, and is 
explicit in Pöppel (1997, 2009), where research evidence from multiple areas, supposedly 
converging on a common duration for a frame of conscious perception, is taken as evidence for 
the generality of the proposed frame. Most other authors have endorsed frames that are local, 
sometimes to modalities (usually vision), sometimes to defined activities, processes, or 
mechanisms within modalities, such as visual attention, and sometimes of variable duration. 
 
1.2: Discrete frames and the subjective continuity of perceptual experience 
 
 An analogy is sometimes taken with film projection, originally by Ansbacher (1944) and 
Stroud (1956), and by others since, including Craig (2009a), Freeman (2006), Hogendoorn 
(2016), Kozma and Freeman (2017), McComas and Cupido (1999), and Pockett, Brennan, Bold, 
and Holmes (2011). In this analogy, the frame of conscious perception is equivalent to a single 
frame of a film in the gate of the projector, and the subjective fluency of conscious perception is 
equivalent to the continuity of the film as projected on the screen. The analogy is imperfect 
because, in fact, the projection on the screen is also a series of stills, and the illusion of temporal 
continuity is a product of the operating characteristics of visual information processing, such as 
the flicker fusion frequency (Carmel, Saker, Rees, & Lavie, 2007; Curran & Wattis, 1998).1 
However, the analogy does serve to elucidate a significant problem for the frame hypothesis: if 
everything within a single frame is experienced as contemporaneous, and then it is replaced by a 
new frame, within which again everything is experienced as contemporaneous, why does the 
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succession of static frames not give rise to subjective jerkiness in conscious perception, and how 
is the subjective continuity of conscious perception established? 
 An analogy can be taken with the patient suffering from akinetopsia studied by Zihl, von 
Cramon, and Mai (1983). Based on her self-report, her visual world consisted of a series of static 
images lacking any motion information, which left her able to make judgments about temporal 
succession but unable to judge simple practical matters such as when to stop pouring tea into a 
cup. The time scale of image succession is not clear but could have been around 1 s or more; 
clinical testing suggested that this depended on factors such as speed of stimulus motion. 
However, the point is that the discrete frame hypothesis implies that conscious perception should 
proceed in a series of static images with jerks marking the transition from one frame to the next, 
resulting in a faster version of akinetopsia. In fact, our perceptual experience does not resemble 
that of the patient with akinetopsia, even allowing for the slower frame-rate she may have 
experienced. 
 There are at least two possible solutions to that problem. One is that limited temporal 
resolution in specific areas of information processing may result in a kind of smearing of 
information across multiple frames, which effectively obscures frame boundaries. Taking up the 
analogy with film projection, when watching a film, continuous motion and change are 
perceived because the rate of frame presentation is faster than the flicker fusion rate (Carmel et 
al., 2007; Curran & Wattis, 1998). Perceptible flicker or jerkiness only occurs if the frame-rate 
of the film projection is reduced to a value below the flicker fusion rate. Thus, so long as frame 
duration is shorter than the temporal resolution of relevant processes, the progression of frames 
should not be experienced as jerky. The second solution is that the continuity of experience may 
be created by some kind of filling-in process, such as model-fitting, which would impose a 
model of continuity on discrete packets of information (VanRullen et al., 2014). VanRullen et al. 
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(2014) argued that this could be a temporal analogue of the visual mechanisms that fill in the 
blind spot in the visual field (Durgin, Tripathy, & Levi, 1995; Fiorani, de Oliveira, Volchan, 
Pessoa, Gattass, & Rocha-Miranda, 2003). 
 
2: Early proposals 
 
 The idea that conscious percepts fall into discrete temporal frames has a long history: 
something like it appeared over 2,000 years ago in Buddhist thinking (Herzog, Kammer, & 
Scharnowski, 2016; Pockett et al., 2011). In more recent scientific work it may date back to von 
Baer (1862)2, although the original presentation does not survive and there is uncertainty about 
its content (Elliott & Giersch, 2016). Elliott and Giersch (2016) stated that von Baer had 
proposed "a fundamental quantum of experienced time" (Elliott & Giersch, 2016, p. 1) with a 
duration of about 55 ms. This is consistent with research by Brecher (1932) showing a 
nonsimultaneity threshold of about 55 ms with both tactile and visual stimuli although, as we 
shall see, more recent research has shown a wide range of nonsimultaneity thresholds and 
Brecher's results can no longer be regarded as definitive in that respect. Clay (1882) proposed a 
"specious present", a kind of psychological moment that extends beyond the present, 
encompassing some of the past: an example he gave was that all of the notes in a short tune seem 
to be contained in the present.3 James (1890) further developed that idea, and suggested a time 
scale of about 5 - 6 s. Proposals about frames on a time scale of greater than 1 s have been 
reviewed elsewhere (White, 2017a). Here the concern is specifically with frames on the sub-
second scale: that is, short periods of time within which, hypothetically at least, events are 
experienced as contemporaneous. Proposals falling into that category date back to the 1940s: a 
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brief survey of these is a useful way of introducing themes and issues that apply to the topic as a 
whole. 
 
2.1: Frames in vision: Ansbacher (1944) 
 
 Ansbacher (1944) presented a rotating wheel on which an arc of 36° was presented. 
Participants judged the length of the arc they perceived, and Ansbacher found that the perceived 
arc was shorter than the actual arc, with the perceived shrinkage increasing as rotation rate 
increased. Other stimuli, such as sine waves and triangles, resulted in even greater perceived 
shrinkage. Ansbacher argued that the findings could be explained on the hypothesis that visual 
events were sampled at periodic intervals. With periodic sampling, one sample of the arc's 
location is liable to overlap with the next. Ansbacher argued that overlapping segments were 
suppressed due to some form of contrast masking, so that only non-overlapping portions were 
perceived. He was able to account for the results, not only the change in shrinkage with rotation 
rate, but also differences in degree of shrinkage between different kinds of stimuli, by assuming 
a sampling rate of about 12 Hz. He argued that this represented a general operating property of 
the visual system, that the system is active for short periods separated by short periods of 
inactivity. This is, therefore, a proposal of a general frame in vision with a duration of ~80 ms. 
 Subsequent research has led to the postulation of other explanations for the effect. Anstis, 
Stürzel, and Spillmann (1999) pointed out that perception involves summation or integration of 
visual information over time (McKee & Welch, 1985; Simpson, 1994; Snowden & Braddick, 
1991), and that this would result in perceptual elongation of moving objects along the axis of 
motion. They argued for a perceptual foreshortening process that compensates for this to result 
in percepts that are approximately correct, and they argued that both their results and those 
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reported by Ansbacher (1944) and others could be explained as an effect of this compensation 
mechanism. However, it is not clear why compensation would result in perceptual shrinkage 
rather than accurate length perception. Geremek, Stürzel, da Pos, and Spillmann (2002) found 
evidence for the involvement of backward masking and argued that perceptual shrinkage effects 
could result from that. At present, there is still uncertainty about the correct explanation for the 
perceptual shrinkage phenomenon, and it should additionally be noted that most studies have 
found less shrinkage that was reported by Ansbacher (Anstis et al., 1999). However, it is likely 
that the explanation lies with one or more low level visual mechanisms, and that it is a specific 
effect of the operation of those mechanisms. That is, there is no need to postulate a general frame 
of vision, much less a general frame of conscious perception, because the phenomenon is 
process-specific. In this case, there is not even a need to propose a local or process-specific 
frame, because the phenomenon can be explained without recourse to that idea. This is a theme 
that will recur in this review: that frame-like phenomena can be explained by reference to 
operating characteristics of local processing, without a need to propose even local frames of 
perception. 
 
2.2: Cortical scanning and the psychological moment hypothesis 
 
 The cortical scanning hypothesis originated with Pitts & McCulloch (1947), who 
proposed an initial layer of neurons from which impulses descend to a second level where they 
are averaged or otherwise integrated over a fixed time period which is the duration of the 
scanning cycle. Scanning is a cyclical activity in which layers of the cortex go through phases of 
increased or decreased receptivity to incoming information: thus, a frame would be the summed 
information content of a single receptive cycle. Pitts and McCullogh associated this with the 
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alpha rhythm, about which more will be said later (sections 2.3 and 3.3). This was developed 
into the psychological moment hypothesis by Stroud (1949, 1956). Stroud's idea was that a 
scanning cycle eliminated information about temporality, through the summing or combining or 
averaging process; thus, perceived movement or change was the result of an inference based on 
differences between successive psychological moments. Stroud (1956, 1967) argued that the 
impression of motion when watching a movie occurs because "at the level of data processing of 
which we are aware, our visual system processes visual inputs in similar logical blocks" (1967, 
p. 624), which are the psychological moments. He argued that events within a given 
psychological moment are experienced as cotemporal, and that the impression of motion occurs 
when there is at least one frame of a movie per psychological moment. He proposed a duration 
for the psychological moment of about 100 ms, with a range from about 50 ms or less to about 
200 ms. This range was based on a survey of research on several different topics including 
brightness matching, auditory stimulus thresholds, reaction times, and the effects of short bursts 
of white noise on speech intelligibility (Stroud, 1956). One line of research discussed by Stroud 
(1956) was that by von Békésy (1936), showing that threshold intensity for tones of low 
frequency exhibits a step function when plotted against frequency. Stroud predicted (or, strictly 
speaking, postdicted) the locations of the steps by assuming an integration interval of 106 ms. 
Subsequent research has shown a range of stimulus discrimination thresholds and temporal 
integration intervals far greater and more variable than that in the research discussed by Stroud 
(1956): both that research and its relevance to the psychological moment hypothesis will be 
discussed in section 4.2. 
 Evidence relevant to Stroud's hypothesis was reviewed by Shallice (1964). Of particular 
interest is Shallice's analysis of research on perceptual causality by Michotte (1963). Michotte 
presented visual stimuli in which a moving object (A) contacted an initially stationary object (B), 
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whereupon B moved off in the same direction and at the same speed. This usually gives rise to a 
perceptual impression that A made B move (Hubbard, 2013a, 2013b; Michotte, 1963; White, 
2017b). In one experiment there was a delay between A contacting B and B starting to move. 
Michotte found that the causal impression reliably occurred with delays up to 56 ms. With 
delays between 56 and 140 ms an intermediate impression occurred, such that the causal 
impression was there but B was perceived as delayed or as sticking to A temporarily. With 
delays over 140 ms the motion of B was almost never perceived as caused by A. Shallice argued 
that the causal impression depends on the operation of a change detector that integrates 
information from successive perceptual "moments". If the contact time of A and B covers two 
(or more) consecutive "moments", then no change is detected and no causal impression will 
occur. If the contact time covers part of a single "moment" then change is detected and the causal 
impression occurs. If the contact time covers the whole of a "moment" then also change is 
detected and the causal impression occurs, but because A and B are perceived as in contact for 
the duration of a "moment", then the "sticking" impression will occur. From Michotte's data it is 
possible to estimate the duration of a "moment" on the basis of that reasoning, and Shallice 
judged it to be close to 100 ms, similar to the value proposed by Stroud (1956). 
 There are two problems with that argument. One is that Stroud argued that events within 
a psychological moment are experienced as cotemporal. In that case, a psychological moment 
has no subjective duration. Therefore, being in contact for the duration of a psychological 
moment cannot explain the "sticking" impression, which is obviously characterised by temporal 
extension, because there is zero experienced duration. The second problem is that different 
effects of delay have been found in subsequent studies, with causal impressions being reported 
under substantially longer delays than found by Michotte, with variations in presentation 
conditions (Guski & Troje, 2003; Powesland, 1959; Schlottmann, Ray, Mitchell, & Demetriou, 
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2006; Young, Rogers, & Beckmann, 2005). There is some uncertainty about these findings: 
reports and ratings may be influenced by post-perceptual processing and may therefore not 
reflect the actual perceptual impression. However, the findings cast doubt on the idea that the 
delay effect is a guide to the existence and duration of a psychological moment. It should also be 
pointed out that there are other ways of explaining the delay effect (Hubbard, 2013a, 2013b; 
White, 1988, 2017b), so at present the delay effect does not unambiguously support the 
psychological moment hypothesis. 
 
2.3: Cortical excitability 
 
 The hypothesis of a cortical excitability cycle appears to have originated in work by 
Bishop (1932), who demonstrated variations in the responsiveness of neurons to stimuli with 
regular repeating cycles of about 200 ms duration. That was in rabbits, but it has been argued 
that that cycle corresponds to the alpha rhythm in humans, with a cycle duration of about 100 ms 
(Harter, 1967; Lindsley, 1952). Supportive evidence for a similar variation in responsiveness in 
humans, on the time scale of human alpha, was reported by Bechtereva and Zontov (1962) and 
Callaway and Laine (1964). The strategy of the research was to present successive flashes of 
light, and it was shown that the greatest response to the second light occurred when it was 
presented about 100 ms and about 200 ms after the first, and the least response when it was 
presented about 150 ms and about 250 ms after the first. Thus, the alpha rhythm, in this case 
stimulus-driven, was interpreted as a periodic variation in excitability of the relevant area of the 
cortex. 
 Several authors argued that alpha waves could serve as a temporal coding mechanism 
(Harter, 1967). For example, Ellingson (1956) proposed that "when the excitability cycles of a 
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group of neurons are synchronized, then the flow of impulses through that group will be timed 
by the frequency and phase of the cycle" (p. 9). Timing in this case means something more like 
gating, because the supposed advantage of it is to prevent the smearing or distortion that a 
continuous input of stimuli would generate (Lindsley, 1952). The example that Lindsley used to 
illustrate the idea was eye movements in reading, where the written text appears sharp and clear 
despite the blurring that ought to be caused by the movement of the eyes. This immediately 
seems rather odd: a continuous input of stimuli is broken up into discrete packages to prevent 
smearing, but the discrete packages would still have to be temporally integrated to prevent a 
rapid version of akinetopsia in which the visual world consisted of a mere succession of static 
images (Zihl et al., 1983). It is possible that an excitability cycle represents a temporal bin in 
which information is accumulated to the point where the stimulus can be detected. However, 
such a function would not be usefully subserved by a neuronal system that ran at a constant 
frequency. Consider, as an example, visible persistence, the maintenance of an image of a 
stimulus beyond the termination of the stimulus. As Farrell (1984) pointed out, there is a need to 
find a compromise between minimising the smear generated by moving stimuli and maximising 
the time available for analysis of the stimuli. The visual system makes the compromise in a 
flexible way, so that the duration of visible persistence varies depending on the duration of a 
static stimulus and on stimulus motion (Di Lollo, 1977, 1980; Dixon & Di Lollo, 1994). This 
flexibility cannot be accommodated within an excitability cycle of fixed frequency. The cortical 
excitability hypothesis in relation to alpha is still alive and well, however, and I shall offer a 
more up-to-date perspective on it in the sub-section on EEG research. 
 
2.4: Central and perceptual intermittency 
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 The idea of central intermittency was first proposed by Craik (1947). Craik set the task of 
pointing at a moving target, and he found that adjustments were made at discrete intervals, not 
continuously. Craik interpreted this as indicating that the mechanism of behavioural choice went 
through a fixed process and completed it before starting anew. This would generate 
intermittency in adjustments to ongoing behaviour. The idea was further developed by Welford 
(1952), and research on it was reviewed by Bertelson (1966). Two observations suffice for 
present purposes. One is that the observed frequency of adjustment was about 2 Hz, which is far 
to low to form a plausible general frame of conscious perception. The other is that intermittent 
adjustment was observed with novices, but with increasing expertise the adjustment was more 
continuous. This indicates that it is a local phenomenon, possibly confined to motor learning. 
 In principle, intermittency could be a feature of any mechanism that runs in a fixed way 
and cannot handle any further input until processing of the current input has been completed. 
There could, therefore, be perceptual intermittency as well as motor intermittency (Allport, 
1968; Harter, 1967; Kristofferson, 1967a). Kristofferson (1967a) proposed that perceptual 
intermittency is governed by a clock that generates time points at intervals of about 50 ms. These 
time points determine when attention switching can occur, and when information can be 
transmitted from one stage of a process to the next. This is consistent with the single channel 
theory of information processing, according to which only one signal or channel is attended at a 
time and attention switches between signals or channels at intervals. To the extent that this is a 
discrete frame hypothesis, it is specific to attentive processing, as Kristofferson acknowledged. 
Kristofferson argued that two kinds of evidence were relevant to the intermittency hypothesis, 
concerning successiveness discrimination and reaction times. Successiveness discrimination 
refers to the ability to detect whether two stimuli were presented at the same time or not: the 
discrimination threshold can be treated as evidence for the frequency of time points or frames. 
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Reaction times in this case referred specifically to the case where the participant must respond to 
a stimulus that could occur in either of two channels. Kristofferson (1967a) presented evidence 
that supported the proposed time point interval of 50 ms (see also Schmidt & Kristofferson, 
1963). 
 There have been many other studies of both temporal discrimination and reaction time 
phenomena, and I shall review both bodies of evidence later in the paper (sections 4.2 and 3.4, 
respectively). For now, it suffices to say that there is much evidence that does not accord with 
the 50 ms hypothesis, and that shows temporal discrimination thresholds at least an order of 
magnitude shorter than that. In a later revision, Kristofferson (1984) postulated instead a time 
quantum with a value that can vary from 12 ms to 200 ms depending on stimulus presentation 
conditions, and also postulated multiple clocks instead of a single clock, an idea that has 
developed greatly since then (Buonomano, Bramen, & Khodadadifar, 2009; Gamache & 
Grondin, 2010; Goel & Buonomano, 2014;  Gorea, 2011; Hogendoorn, Verstraten, & Johnston, 
2010; Mauk & Buonomano, 2004). 
 Harter (1967) argued that there must be a cortical mechanism for dividing and grouping 
incoming sensory information into discrete temporal units, in the interests of efficient operation. 
The implication is that information cannot be processed faster than the frequency of the temporal 
units. Harter reviewed two hypotheses about the mechanism of central intermittency: these were 
the cortical scanning and cortical excitability cycle hypotheses, which have already been 
discussed. Harter reviewed several kinds of evidence that support the discrete processing 
hypothesis. I will not go into details because that research (like that cited by Stroud, 1956) has 
been largely superseded by subsequent studies that will be reviewed shortly. Harter argued that, 
collectively, the research supported the hypothesis of a time period of about 100 ms, with a 
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range from 50 - 200 ms. This was not strictly correct even in the evidence Harter surveyed: 
reported time periods ranged from 20 ms (Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961) to 500 ms (Craik, 1947). 
 
2.5: Overview of early proposals 
 
 In the early proposals, in most cases, frames or discontinuous processing were proposed 
as features of specific processes or activities such as pointing at moving targets, or temporal 
discrimination with visual stimuli, not as general features of conscious percepts. Stroud (1949, 
1956, 1967) proposed the psychological moment as a general feature of visual processing but did 
not extend the proposal to other modalities. Some themes have emerged that are of continued 
relevance to more recent work. Discrete frames may be a feature of local processes, which 
means that evidence must be obtained from many different processes in different modalities 
before a case can be made for frames as a general feature of conscious perception, even within a 
single modality. Periodic switching of attention between stimuli or channels may be a means of 
coping with complex informational input, and discrete processing epochs may be a consequence 
of attention switching. EEG regularities such as alpha may be indicators of periodic phenomena 
in information processing such as receptivity to new input. Individual frames do not give rise to 
any experience or perception of a temporally extended property, of any kind of change (e.g. 
motion), or of duration, because everything within a single frame is experienced as 
contemporaneous: for perception of change, some form of integration of information across 
more than one frame is necessary. This last point, as I shall show in the following review, is not 
correct. 
 
3: Recent proposals about discrete frames 
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 Specific proposals will be briefly summarised and evaluated against either the kinds of 
evidence on which the authors of the proposals called or on evidence relevant to the proposed 
frame durations. Issues that apply to all the proposals will be addressed in section 4. 
 
3.1: Attention-based periodic sampling 
 
 The most sustained research investigation of discrete frames in conscious perception is 
that by VanRullen and colleagues (Busch, Dubois, & VanRullen, 2009; Busch & VanRullen, 
2010; Chakravarthi & VanRullen, 2012; Dubois & VanRullen, 2011; Ilhan & VanRullen, 2012; 
Macdonald, Cavanagh, & VanRullen, 2014; Miconi & VanRullen, 2010; VanRullen, 2016; 
VanRullen, Busch, Drewes, & Dubois, 2011; VanRullen, Carlson, & Cavanagh, 2007; 
VanRullen & Dubois, 2011; VanRullen & Koch, 2003; VanRullen & Macdonald, 2012; 
VanRullen, Reddy, & Koch, 2005, 2006; VanRullen et al., 2014). The earliest paper in the 
series, VanRullen and Koch (2003), posited that "[c]onscious perception might well be constant 
within a snapshot of variable duration... Discrete perception implies that two distinct events will 
be judged as simultaneous or sequential depending not only on the time interval between them, 
but also on their temporal relationship to some intrinsic discrete neuronal process" (p. 207). 
Thus, a frame of conscious perception would be defined in terms of subjective contemporaneity 
of events within it, and would be explained as a product of the modus operandi of perceptual 
processing. Although the quotation does not specify a modality, in fact all of the research that 
has been called on as support for the frame hypothesis in this body of work concerns vision, as 
will be shown in this section. VanRullen (2016) favoured the hypothesis of "multiple perceptual 
cycles, in distinct brain networks, with different periodicities" (p. 725). If that is a valid 
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reflection of the evidence, then it effectively disconfirms the hypothesis of a general frame for 
all of conscious perception, instead supporting a hypothesis that frames are local processing 
phenomena. 
 Within vision, the frame hypothesis most generally advocated in this body of research is 
specific to attentive visual processing. VanRullen and Dubois (2011) and VanRullen et al. 
(2014) argued that attentive processing is periodic, essentially analysing successive discrete 
samples of information as units, and that this enables attention to take samples of information 
from a single perceptual target or object, and also to scan multiple targets sequentially, which is 
a contemporary version of the single channel theory of information processing. VanRullen et al. 
(2014) stated, "Attention is often considered as the gateway to consciousness..., and it follows 
that if the gate opens periodically, the contents of consciousness will also update periodically" 
(p. 5). Based on the research evidence, the periodicity of attentive sampling is about 7 - 13 Hz, 
corresponding to frame durations of about 80 - 140 ms. VanRullen (2016) reviewed a large body 
of research on effects of pre-stimulus oscillatory phase on perception, concluding that the 
research showed two peaks at 7 Hz and 11 Hz. He argued that the latter reflected 
sensory/perceptual processing and the former reflected periodic attentive sampling. This would 
imply that attentive sampling may account for some periodicity, but that peridiocity is also a 
feature of other forms of processing. VanRullen (2016) concluded: "After conceding that there 
might not exist a single common sampling rhythm affecting all of our perceptions, but instead 
many simultaneous rhythms that periodically modulate various perceptual and cognitive 
functions in distinct modalities at independent rates, one begins to see perceptual rhythms 
(almost) everywhere" (p. 732). Thus, while there has been an emphasis on frames with a 
duration in the range 80 - 140 ms, it is acknowledged that there may be other, process-specific 
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frame rates, so that there may be little or no co-ordination of frames across modalities. I shall 
now survey the range of evidence that has been called on in this body of literature.  
 
3.1.1: The continuous wagon wheel illusion 
 
 It has long been known that images of rotating wagon wheels on cinema screens can 
appear to depict rotation in the wrong direction, because of the temporal relationship between the 
rotation rate of the wheel and the frame rate of film projection technology (Levichkina, Fedorov, 
& van Leeuwen, 2014). However, many studies have shown that a similar illusion of motion 
reversal can occur with real rotating objects, such as discs with a sunburst pattern on them, under 
continuous illumination (Arnold, Pearce, & Marinovic, 2014; Purves, Paydarfar, & Andrews, 
1996; VanRullen et al., 2005). The aim here is not to review the literature on this, known as the 
continuous wagon wheel illusion (cWWI), but specifically to assess whether the findings support 
the hypothesis of conscious (visual) perception as a discrete frame updated at periodic intervals. 
 Using a sunburst pattern of alternating black and white spokes on a rotating disc, the 
frequency with which colours alternate at any given spatial location can be varied by 
manipulating either the width of the spokes or the rotation rate. By varying these, VanRullen et 
al. (2005) found that, under a variety of different conditions, the peak rate of reporting the cWWI 
occurred at an alternation rate of about 10 Hz. They argued that this can be explained as a result 
of "discrete attentional "snapshots" taken every 50-100 ms" (p. 5296). Two further observations 
are relevant here. They found the same 10 Hz peak with both first-order and second-order 
motion, indicating that the illusion cannot be completely explained by reference to low-level 
visual mechanisms (Burr & Thompson, 2011). They also found that the peak at 10 Hz did not 
occur if a distractor task was used, indicating that the involvement of attention may be necessary 
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for the illusion to occur. The evidence is, therefore, consistent with the hypothesis that 
perceptual frames are a product of periodic attentive sampling. Several other studies of the 
cWWI have reported evidence supporting discrete snapshots at a rate of approximately 13 Hz 
(see Arnold et al., 2014; Macdonald et al., 2014; Simpson et al., 2005; VanRullen et al., 2006). 
 There are several problems with that evidence and argument in relation to the discrete 
frame hypothesis. The cWWI does not occur on most trials: even at the rate of peak occurrence, 
in the study by VanRullen et al. (2005) the illusion was reported on no more than 30% of trials. 
If discrete frames are being constructed all the time, it is hard to explain why the illusion does 
not occur more often. Moreover, the illusion does not occur on first exposure to the stimulus, and 
in fact at least 14 s of adaptation is necessary for the illusion to occur (Kline, Holcombe, & 
Eagleman, 2004, 2006). It is not clear why adaptation should be necessary if the illusion is a 
product of discrete frame construction that is going on all the time. Thus, if the evidence 
concerning the cWWI does support a frame hypothesis, it could only be a frame hypothesis that 
was not only modality-specific and process-specific, but also temporally specific, occurring at 
some times and not at others. This is very far from supporting a claim that all attentive visual 
processing proceeds in discrete frames. 
 In addition, although the peak rate of reporting the illusion in the study by VanRullen et 
al. (2005) occurred at 10 Hz, rates of reporting the illusion did not vary much at longer periods, 
and even at 40 Hz the rate was greater than 10%. Beyond 30 Hz the frequency of reporting any 
motion declined sharply because the stimulus was increasingly perceived just as a blur with no 
clear motion direction. However, while correct direction perception declined in lockstep with the 
overall decrease in reporting motion, illusory reversal did not decline. Because of this, 
considering only those trials on which a direction of motion was reported, the percentage of 
trials that were illusory motion actually increased as the alternation rate increased, and 
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approached 50% at 40 Hz (VanRullen et al., 2005, Figures 1a and 1b). There is, at least, a wide 
spread of frequencies over which the cWWI occurs, and only a small proportion of occurrences 
are at 10 Hz. A spread of responses in the opposite direction was reported by Arnold et al. 
(2014): illusory motion reversals occurred quite often (compared to the peak frequency) at just 2 
Hz (500 ms). Simpson, Shahani, and Manahilov (2005), on the other hand, found results 
consistent with a peak sampling rate of 16 Hz. These varied results indicate that there must be 
factors, possibly specific to the methods of individual studies, that influence the rate at which the 
cWWI occurs. In order to reconcile these findings with even a local discrete frame hypothesis, it 
would be necessary to accept that frames do not have a fixed periodicity, but instead vary over a 
range from 2 Hz to 40 Hz, at least. In that case, at low frame rates the problem of jerkiness arises 
and is less easy to deal with. 
 Arnold et al. (2014) found evidence for different peak frequencies of reporting the 
illusion depending on whether the sunburst pattern was created by luminance variations with 
constant colour (grey) or by colour variations (red-green) with constant luminance. They found 
peaks at 10 Hz for luminance-defined patterns (replicating VanRullen et al., 2005 and several 
other studies) and at 5 Hz for colour-defined patterns. It is not likely that the rate of discrete 
frames of conscious perception would vary by a factor of two depending just on whether a 
sunburst was grey with luminance differences or coloured without luminance differences. 
Finally, Kline et al. (2004) presented two stimuli simultaneously and found times where the 
illusion occurred with one stimulus and not the other. This is a strong indication that the illusion 
is a local phenomenon, in which case it could not be an indicator of something general to 
conscious visual perception. 
 Arnold et al. (2014) proposed a different kind of explanation for the cWWI. A full 
account of this lies outside the scope of the present paper. However, it is based on the idea that 
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attentive tracking of object features operates with a relatively low temporal resolution, so that 
features cannot be tracked if the rate of change in them exceeds ~10 Hz. This can result in 
mismatching features such that, with a rotating sunburst pattern, one spoke may be incorrectly 
matched to an adjacent spoke. In effect, because of its poor temporal resolution, attentive 
processing loses track of which spoke is which, with consequent erroneous or illusory 
perception. This explanation has yet to be confirmed in further research, but it does exemplify 
the possibility that the cWWI can be explained by local processing characteristics, without 
recourse to the discrete frame hypothesis. 
 In conclusion, the findings of studies on the cWWI do not support the discrete frame 
hypothesis. Whatever the explanation for the cWWI, it is a phenomenon that is occasional in 
occurrence, variable in rate of occurrence from 2 Hz to 40 Hz, localised in the visual field, 
specific to the visual system, and possible explicable as a phenomenon of fatigue or adaptation, 
or problems caused by low temporal resolution in visual processing. An additional problem is 
that the peak frequency of the cWWI is in the region of 10 - 13 Hz, which is outside the value of 
7 Hz proposed for periodic attentive sampling by VanRullen (2016) on the basis of EEG 
evidence. 
 
3.1.2: EEG oscillations 
 
 Numerous periodic oscillations have been shown to occur in the brain. Other authors 
have also suggested that EEG oscillations might be indicators of discrete frames in perception or 
consciousness (e.g. Freeman, 2004, 2006), but in this section I focus on studies that have been 
taken as evidence supporting the attention sampling hypothesis of VanRullen and colleagues. 
Specifically, there is evidence of an association between pre-stimulus oscillatory phase and 
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perception, such as ability to detect a near-threshold stimulus (Busch et al., 2009; Busch & 
VanRullen, 2010; Drewes & VanRullen, 2011; VanRullen, 2016; VanRullen et al., 2011). 
VanRullen (2016), compiling the results of several studies conducted by him and his colleagues, 
reported that the clearest evidence of a relationship between pre-stimulus phase and perception 
occurred with oscillations around 7 Hz and 10 Hz. As discussed earlier, VanRullen argued that 
the former was a marker of the rate of attentive sampling, and the latter was associated with 
perceptual processing. The question is whether this evidence, particularly the evidence about the 
7 Hz oscillation, really supports the hypothesis of discrete frames in conscious, attentive visual 
perception. Five main concerns can be raised. 
 One concern, noted by VanRullen (2016), is that, across the whole range of studies in his 
review, the oscillatory frequencies that were associated with perceptual effects ranged from 1 Hz 
to 30 Hz "but without any apparent logic relating frequency to perceptual or cognitive function" 
(VanRullen, 2016, p. 727). Clearly conscious perception cannot proceed in discrete frames of 
1,000 ms in duration, which would be implied if they were set by an oscillatory frequency of 1 
Hz. This would result in very obvious and disabling disruption to visual perception, resembling 
that experienced by the patient with akinetopsia (Zihl et al., 1983). Presumably only some of the 
reported influential frequencies act to set discrete frames of conscious perception, but which 
ones and why? That is, if some do and some do not, what marks the difference between them? It 
could be argued that the 7 Hz oscillation is special in that regard, because it is found most 
commonly and it is linked to attentive sampling. However, it does not occur all the time, and in 
particular is suppressed when the eyes are opened (Bazanova & Vernon, 2014; Harter, 1967; 
Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 2007; McComas & Cupido, 1999). It is perhaps not 
impossible that visual perception could consist of discrete frames some of the time but not all of 
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the time, but it seems likely that there would be some associated difference that would be evident 
in perception. I shall return to this issue at the end of this sub-section. 
 A second concern, also noted by VanRullen (2016), is that the variability in perception 
that is accounted for by oscillatory phase is small. For the collective set of studies reviewed by 
VanRullen (2016), it was 10 - 20%: as an example, in Busch et al. (2009) it was 16%. VanRullen 
et al. (2007), who first reported the 7 Hz result, interpreted it as showing that attention 
periodically sampled information at a rate of approximately seven elements per second. Busch 
and VanRullen (2010) stated, even more strongly, that the spotlight of attention "blinks on and 
off every 100 - 150 ms" (p. 16051). The results do not support such an extreme claim: there is 
just a small difference in the probability of detecting a near-threshold stimulus depending on 
oscillatory phase. Measurement issues could mean that the difference between opposite phases is 
greater than it appears: VanRullen (2016) commented, "It is still unknown whether this small 
effect size is a technical limitation of experimental paradigms (e.g., owing to measurement 
noise) or a true reflection of the meager contribution of these periodicities to the overall 
perceptual experience" (p. 732). As they stand, however, the results do not support the 
hypothesis of attention switching on and off: at most, there is a significant but small decrement 
in attention depending on the phase of the oscillation. 
 The clearest problem for a discrete frame with a frequency of 7 Hz, and indeed for any 
hypothesized frame of that order of magnitude, concerns the definition of a discrete frame 
adopted by VanRullen and colleagues (and by other authors - e.g. Wittmann, 2009, 2011), that 
events within a single frame are experienced as contemporaneous. Suppose a frame has a 
duration of ~140 ms, as implied by a rate of 7 Hz. If two events are separated by 10 ms, there is 
a 93% probability that they will fall into the same frame, and a 7% probability that they will 
occur in different frames. If events within one frame are experienced as contemporaneous and 
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events in different frames are experienced as successive, then a temporal discrimination 
judgment will be correct 7% of the time and will be at chance level the other 93% of the time. 
Several studies, however, have shown various kinds of visual temporal discrimination, such as 
experienced nonsimultaneity, for stimuli separated by less than 10 ms (Georgeson & Georgeson, 
1985; Sweet, 1953; Tadin, Lappin, Blake, & Glasser, 2010; Wehrhahn & Rapf, 1992; 
Westheimer & McKee, 1977). The only way to maintain the hypothesis of a discrete frame with 
a duration of 140 ms in the face of that evidence is to abandon the definition in terms of 
perceived contemporaneity. A possible alternative would refer to frequency of updating. A frame 
can be conceived as a brief store of perceptual information derived by perceptual processing. 
Thus, a perceptual discrimination process could generate information that one stimulus occurred 
5 ms after another; that information could be entered into a frame; and it would remain there 
until the frame was next updated. In that way long frame duration could be rendered compatible 
with short temporal discriminations. 
 VanRullen et al. (2011) argued that, if discrete frames are defined in terms of experienced 
contemporaneity, then it should be possible to predict whether two events are experienced as 
contemporaneous or sequential from their relationship to the phase of oscillations. Some recent 
studies have now found evidence for this, in vision and in the somatosensory modality 
(Baumgarten, Schnitzler, and Lange, 2015, discussed in section 3.1.4).4 Milton and Pleydell-
Pearce (2016) asked participants to judge whether onset of two visual stimuli was synchronous 
or asynchronous and found an association between alpha phase and tendency to correct judgment 
of stimuli as asynchronous. Samaha and Postle (2015) used a temporal discrimination task where 
participants had to judge whether one flash or two were presented. The authors argued that, if 
alpha marks the frame rate of conscious perception, then the smaller the frame duration, the 
greater the temporal resolution of vision should be. They found this in an individual differences 
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analysis: participants with a faster alpha rhythm showed superior temporal discrimination to 
those with a slower alpha rhythm. Cecere, Rees, and Romei (2015) investigated the double flash 
illusion. In this illusion, a single flash is presented in temporal association with two auditory 
tones and, sometimes, two flashes are perceived. Cecere et al. used transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) to alter the oscillatory frequency of alpha, and found that the temporal 
window for occurrence of the double flash illusion increased when the frequency of alpha was 
reduced and decreased when the frequency of alpha was increased. The authors suggested that 
"alpha oscillations might represent the temporal unit of visual processing that cyclically gates 
perception" (p. 231). 
 Those results are consistent with the hypothesis of a discrete frame in vision with a 
frequency corresponding to, and indeed possibly set by, alpha. Other findings, however, cast 
doubt on that interpretation. Ronconi, Oosterhof, Bonmassar, and Melcher (2017) presented a 
brief visual flash followed after a short inter-stimulus interval (ISI) by a second flash either at 
the same location or at another nearby location. The ISI was timed so that perception of one or 
two flashes, in the former case, and perception of apparent motion or two independent flashes, in 
the latter case, was about equally likely. Perception of one versus two flashes could be predicted 
from the phase of alpha oscillation (8 - 10 Hz), but perception of apparent motion could be 
predicted from the phase of theta oscillation (6 - 7 Hz); note that these are not endogenous 
oscillations, but oscillations triggered by the stimulus. If the results have any implications for 
discrete frames, it would be that frame duration varies depending on the oscillatory frequency 
generated by the stimulus, and different kinds of stimuli generate different oscillatory 
frequencies. But it is more likely that the findings show only that the temporal window of 
integration differs between different perceptual processes, and that they have no implications for 
the discrete frame hypothesis. As Ronconi et al. pointed out (and see section 4.3), temporal 
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integration occurs on multiple time scales ranging from a few milliseconds to 2 s or more. If all 
of those time scales were frames of conscious perception, there would be frames with multiple 
durations occurring contemporaneously. It is more likely that effects of oscillatory frequency on 
perceptual phenomena show only evidence for local variations in temporal integration windows 
for specific perceptual processes. In other words, temporal windows of integration occur in 
processing prior to the point at which frames might occur, and the issue is whether the products 
of all those different processes are than marshalled into periodically updated global 
representations. Effects of oscillatory frequency on temporal integration do not speak to that 
issue. 
 A fifth problem for the 7 Hz oscillation hypothesis is that attention and perception are not 
the same. It is possible that attentive processing involves periodic switching on a time scale of 7 
Hz, but that conscious perception does not. Conscious percepts could be actively maintained 
continuously while being updated periodically. Under the attention switching hypothesis, 
periodicity may lie behind conscious perception, but not within it. Thus, for example, the results 
of the study by Samaha and Postle (2015) might show that alpha rhythm ia s marker of the 
frequency of attentive sampling of input, but this is still compatible with conscious percepts 
being effectively continuous, or continuously updated. The temporal resolution of a perceptual 
process affects the content of information that gets into conscious perception, but without 
necessarily imposing a frame-like structure on conscious perception. 
 
3.1.3: "Perceptual echoes" 
 
 VanRullen and Macdonald (2012) presented stimuli comprising a random series of 
luminance values at 160 frames per second. EEG responses to each luminance change (except 
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those in the early and late stages of the sequence) were recorded and compiled to yield a cross-
correlation summary. The results showed a waveform triggered by the stimulus with a period of 
about 10 Hz that continued for approximately 10 cycles (1,000 ms). They also found evidence 
that reported visual flicker intensity was correlated with 10 Hz oscillations triggered by stimuli 
displayed about 500 - 1,000 ms previously. 
 As the authors noted, numerous studies have previously found that alpha phase can be 
reset or entrained by visual stimuli. The difference, they argued, is that, in their study, the 
oscillations were triggered by nonperiodic stimuli. Not all previous studies were different in that 
respect, however. Barlow (1960) observed a periodic response with a frequency of 10.6 Hz, 
closely matching that found by VanRullen and Macdonald (2012), to regularly repeated visual 
stimuli (brief flashes). This frequency did not match the repetition frequency of the flash, which 
was 1.2 Hz. To exclude the possibility that the periodic response "might represent a higher 
harmonic of the flash frequency" (p. 318), Barlow presented stimuli with variable intervals (0.8 
to 2.0 s) and found the same 10 Hz response. Figure 2 in Barlow (1960) shows the periodic 
response damping out over a period of about 1 s, also similar to that reported by VanRullen and 
Macdonald (2012). The phenomenon was picturesquely described as "ringing" by Harter (1967). 
This appears similar to the finding reported by VanRullen and Macdonald (2012). 
 VanRullen and Macdonald (2012) suggested that the functional significance of these 
oscillations could relate to iconic memory, which in vision has been shown to retain information 
on a time scale up to about 1 s (Coltheart, 1980; Haber, 1983; Sperling, 1960), hence their use of 
the term "perceptual echoes", to capture the idea of a periodically reverberant but decaying 
memory store. 
 There are some problems with that interpretation. Ilhan and VanRullen (2012) sought 
evidence for equivalent "perceptual echoes" in audition but did not find them. This adds to the 
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case that, if there are discrete frames, they do not encompass the whole of perception. In this 
case, however, the interpretation proposed by the authors implies local discrete frames of short-
term visual storage, not of conscious perception, so it may not even be relevant to the frame 
hypothesis. And research evidence about iconic memory indicates not a periodically fluctuating 
informational representation but a continuously maintained representation that decays over time 
with an exponential function (Coltheart, 1980; Haber, 1983; Sperling, 1960). Furthermore, the 
evidence that the alpha oscillations were correlated with reported visual flicker suggests an effect 
on perceptual processing, not memorial processing. 
 The question that should be asked is, what activity might be triggered by the occurrence 
of a novel visual stimulus? Mere storage is certainly one possibility, but there are others. 
Another possibility is that the stimulus triggers some kind of attentive monitoring, for example 
for detecting further stimuli at the same location or changes in the existing stimulus. This would 
be consistent with the proposal of periodic attentive sampling, except that the frequency is about 
10 Hz instead of the 7 Hz found in the attentive sampling research (VanRullen et al., 2007, 2011, 
2014). Other possibilities concern functions proposed for alpha in general, which will be briefly 
reviewed in section 3.3. The existing evidence does not allow any informed choice between 
different hypotheses about the functional significance of the oscillations, so the term "perceptual 
echoes" should not be used until and unless that particular functional hypothesis is confirmed by 
further research. 
 The oscillations appear to have been triggered by each luminance change. Since 
luminance changes were presented at a rate of 160 Hz, this seems to imply that 160 separate 
oscillations would be triggered per second, which means that, if each one persists for 1,000 ms, 
there would be about 160 of them going on at any one time until the stimulus sequence 
terminates. If each oscillation is an informational representation of a luminance change, then the 
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iconic storage hypothesis is not correct, because the capacity of iconic store has been estimated 
at ~40 bits of information (Sperling, 1960; see also Sligte, Vandenbroucke, Scholte, & Lamme, 
2010): 160 representations of events is well beyond that capacity limit. However, the possibility 
of 160 contemporaneous oscillations is also incompatible with any hypothesis involving 
attention, because attention does not have the capacity to be divided between 160 stimuli. It 
should also be noted that a presentation rate of 160 Hz implies a duration for each luminance 
event of about 6 ms, which is far below the flicker fusion frequency (Carmel et al., 2007; Curran 
& Wattis, 1998), so it is likely that individual events would not register in conscious perception 
at all. The functional significance of the oscillations reported by VanRullen and Macdonald 
(2012) therefore remains mysterious at present. 
 
3.1.4: Other modalities 
 
 VanRullen et al. (2014) sought evidence equivalent to that reported for vision (and 
summarised in the foregoing three sub-sections) in the auditory modality. They reported that 
there was no evidence for an auditory equivalent to the cWWI, no evidence for effects of pre-
stimulus oscillatory phase on detection of near-threshold auditory stimuli (see also Zoefel & 
Heil, 2013), and no evidence for a stimulus-triggered 10 Hz oscillation in response to auditory 
events presented at 160 Hz (Ilhan & VanRullen, 2012). They suggested that perceptual cycles 
(or discrete frames) could occur in audition, but be manifested in different ways and at different 
frequencies. In fact, there is plenty of evidence for that. 
 Much auditory processing involves sampling over time. For example, perception of 
loudness can involve summation of information over about 200 ms (Räsänen & Laine, 2013; 
Rimmele, Sussman, & Poeppel, 2015; Zwislocki, 1969; see also Näätänen & Winkler, 1999). 
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This raises the possibility that periodic oscillations have a functional role in temporal integration 
of auditory information. Taking speech perception as an example, it has been shown that speech 
sounds have a hierarchical set of temporal structures ranging from low level features such as 
formant transitions on a time scale of 20 - 40 ms, equivalent to an oscillatory frequency in the 
range of 25 - 50 Hz (Poeppel, 2003; Rosen, 1992), to syllables and whole words on a time scale 
of hundreds of milliseconds (Chait, Greenberg, Arai, Simon, & Poeppel, 2015; Poeppel, 2003), 
and even beyond to narrative units on a scale of many seconds (Hasson, Chen, & Honey, 2015). 
Chait et al. (2015) made a case that speech signals are analysed on multiple time scales and that 
information generated by these analyses is integrated to form speech percepts. It would seem 
plausible, then, that periodic oscillations might have functional significance in analyses of 
speech components such as syllables that have consistent durations. 
 Several studies have found evidence for stimulus-triggered oscillations in response to 
speech input. Mai, Minett, and Wang (2016) reviewed evidence for the involvement of 
oscillations at 4 - 8 Hz (theta), 13 - 30 Hz (beta), and 30 - 50 Hz (gamma). In their own study 
they found associations between phonological processing and delta and theta (for both words 
and non-words), beta associated possibly with memory processing and auditory-motor 
interactions, and gamma possibly associated with lexical memory retrieval (to do with 
distinguishing words from non-words). These results at least hint at functional roles for 
oscillations in speech processing, including adding meaning to speech representations as well 
as analysing the temporal structure of speech. Ortiz-Mantilla, Hämäläinen, Realpe-Bonilla, 
and Benasich (2016) showed changes in EEG responses to native and non-native phonemes 
between 6 and 12 months of age. They suggested that theta oscillations support syllable 
processing, which is consistent with the fact that theta oscillation frequencies approximately 
match typical syllable durations (Giraud & Poeppel, 2012), and that gamma oscillations 
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"underlie phonemic perceptual narrowing, progressively favouring mapping of native over 
non-native language across the first year of life" (Ortiz-Mantilla et al., 2016, p. 12095). It is 
noteworthy that none of the research has implicated alpha. 
 The main problem with the proposed association between temporal levels of speech 
organisation and oscillatory frequencies is that the duration of elements in speech is not 
fixed. Syllables, for example, vary in duration by 150 ms or more (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007), 
and these variations occur continuously through ongoing speech. Giraud and Poeppel (2012) 
have proposed that salient points in speech input, such as boundaries between syllables or 
words, reset the phase of the relevant oscillation. This would presumably mean that the phase 
is reset at each boundary except when two or more consecutive syllables have the same 
duration. In that case, the oscillations would not exhibit regular periodicity. It would make 
functional sense for oscillations to be reset at unit boundaries, assuming that a single 
oscillation marks some kind of processing unit. A study by Kösem, Basirat, Azizi, and van 
Wassenhove (2016) found that high frequency oscillations (including gamma) showed phase 
shifts as a function of the spoken word, supporting the hypothesis of Giraud and Poeppel 
(2012) that gamma oscillations are associated with encoding of phonemes. However, the low 
frequency oscillations they observed (delta and theta) did not seem to match the temporal 
features of the acoustic structures they were supposed to be tracking. They suggested that the 
low-frequency oscillations represented attentional modulation of acoustic processing, not 
chunking of semantic units. 
 This is a large and complex literature (see, e.g., Zoefel & VanRullen, 2015), but the 
research does have some import for the discrete frame issue. First, the differences in salient 
oscillatory frequencies between vision and audition add further weight to the case against 
general discrete frames of conscious perception. The speech perception findings are specific 
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to speech processing, in particular in the fact that they are entrained or reset by relevant 
features of speech input. And, while they may mark fluctuations in attentive sampling, they 
do not seem to mark boundaries between temporally unitary and meaningful percepts, which 
is what would be expected of discrete frames of perception. This undermines the case that 
periodicity in attentive sampling or attention switching indicates discrete frames in conscious 
perception. 
 One more study is relevant in this context. Baumgarten et al. (2015) investigated the 
relationship between oscillations and temporal discrimination in the sensorimotor modality. 
They found that correct detection of two (versus one) somatosensory stimuli depended on the 
phase of beta oscillations, in the range 8 - 20 Hz, though with the greatest effect between 14 
and 18 Hz. Detection rate rose from 40% at one phase to more than 70% at the opposite 
phase. The authors argued that the results supported a hypothesis of discrete sampling, such 
that if two stimuli are presented within a single sampling period they are experienced as one, 
but if they are presented either side of a frame boundary they are experienced as two. This 
result again shows effects of modality-specific periodicity, because the critical oscillatory 
frequency differs from that most often found in vision. However, discrete sampling is not the 
same as discrete frames of conscious perception. It is likely that the beta oscillation does 
mark periodic variations in something relevant to temporal discrimination: that something 
might be receptivity to input, as proposed by VanRullen (2016; VanRullen et al., 2014) or the 
cortical excitability hypothesis (Harter, 1967; Lindsley, 1952). If reduced attention means a 
reduction in processing resources applied to input information, then temporal differences are 
less likely to be detected during the reducted receptivity phase of the cycle. That has no 
necessary implication for whether or not conscious percepts are organised in discrete 
successive frames. They are just two different things. 
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3.1.5: "Visual trails" 
 
 The term "visual trails" was used by Dubois and VanRullen (2011) to refer to a 
specific effect that sometimes occurs after taking certain drugs, such as LSD and nefazodone. 
The effect is not a trail in the sense of a continuous image or a streak, but a series of discrete 
images that persist behind a percept of a moving object and gradually fade, usually in no 
more than a few seconds but persisting for as much as one minute in at least one case (Ihde-
Scholl & Jefferson, 2001). Dubois and VanRullen suggested that the periodic nature of the 
images in the trails could relate to periodic activity in motion perception. Thus, if visual 
perceptual processing generates a series of discrete frames, then the effect of the drug could 
be to perpetuate information from previous frames so that they are retained in conscious 
perception, or to disrupt the normal process of suppression of previous frames. In that case, 
the evidence of visual trails could support the hypothesis of discrete frames in conscious 
visual perception. 
 Dubois and VanRullen (2011) acknowledged other possible interpretations of visual 
trails. They discussed the possibility of visual streak suppression, discussed earlier (Anstis et 
al., 1999). If the visual streak suppression mechanism failed then one might expect 
perceptual elongation of objects along the axis of motion. As the term "streak" suggests, 
however, this would not yield a trail of distinct images of objects, but just a perceptual 
distortion of the moving object, or possibly a smear behind its trailing edge. 
 Visual trails are just one entry in a catalogue of visual disturbances involving 
multiplication or extension of moving objects (Bender, Feldman, & Sobin, 1968; 
Gersztenkorn & Lee, 2015; Yun, Lavin, Schatz, & Lesser, 2015). The general category is 
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palinopsia, defined by Bender et al. (1968) as "the persistence or recurrence of visual images 
after the exciting stimulus object has been removed" (p. 321). This definition implies that the 
condition is not confined to the perception of moving objects, and indeed one of the patients 
described by Bender et al. found that an image of an object looked at, such as a clock, would 
persist no matter where she looked, even if she closed her eyes. The cases discussed by 
Bender et al. show that palinopsia is often associated with other disorders of vision such as 
illusory distortion of objects, and they commented: "Palinopsia never occurred as an isolated 
sign" (p. 330). Gersztenkorn and Lee (2015) described eight categories of palinopsia, of 
which visual trailing is one, and they also described several other types of visual disturbance 
often associated with palinopsia; akinetopsia was one of these. 
 Palinopsia has many causes, including brain lesions, epilepsy, metabolic disease, 
inflammatory demyelination in multiple sclerosis, migraine, some illicit drugs, and some 
prescription drugs. Of course those are global causes that do not specify changes in visual 
information processing. However, as Gersztenkorn and Lee (2015) pointed out, there are 
mechanisms in visual perception that operate to maintain sharp and distinct visual images 
during eye movements and perception of moving objects; these include visual streak 
suppression (Anstis et al., 1999) and visible persistence (Di Lollo, 1977; Farrell, 1984). 
Gersztenkorn and Lee suggested that the initiating causes of palinopsia may act by creating 
what they called "persistent, diffuse, neuronal hyperexcitability" (p. 6), and that this could 
produce failures of visual masking and visual streak suppression. A simulation by Kilpatrick 
and Ermentrout (2012) supported this line of reasoning. This explanation does not seem to 
account for the occurrence of discrete images of the object, but would be more likely to 
produce extensive smearing or streaking. However, the hypothesis of general perseverance of 
previous discrete frames does not account for the effect either. This is because most of the 
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visual field moves on as normal, but the visual trail is superimposed on it, and clearly 
represents just a portion of the preceding visual percept. In fact the trails are sometimes very 
specific: Yun et al. (2015) discussed a patient who reported visual trails with her own arm 
movements but not with her leg movements nor with anything else. It would be hard for a 
discrete frame interpretation to account for this very local effect. 
 At present, then, palinopsia in general, and visual trails in particular, constitute an 
intriguing set of malfunctions in visual processing that has no satisfactory explanation. Their 
relevance to the discrete frame hypothesis is unclear at present but further investigation of 
them, particularly at the neurophysiological level, could potentially reveal more about 
framing, sampling, or updating in visual processing. 
 
3.1.6: Overview of the attentive sampling hypothesis 
 
 There is strong evidence for effects of pre-stimulus oscillations at a frequency of 
about 7 Hz on detection of near-threshold visual stimuli (VanRullen, 2016). This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that attention samples stimulus information periodically, or 
more probably a less extreme hypothesis in which the degree of attentive engagement with 
stimulus information fluctuates periodically. There is also evidence for effects of oscillations 
at various other frequencies, particularly in modalities other than vision. That evidence is not 
consistent with the hypothesis of a general discrete frame for the whole of conscious 
perception on the time scale of the 7 Hz oscillation. One possibility that is consistent with the 
research evidence is that there are local discrete frames in perception, where "local" may 
mean modality-specific or process-specific. However, the oscillations account for only a 
small proportion of the variance in perceptual detection: the spotlight of attention may wax 
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and wane a little, but does not switch on and off, so it is not clear that attentional fluctuations 
mark definite boundaries between frames. Finally, if attentive processing does proceed in 
oscillations, this does not entail that conscious perception does the same. Percepts may be 
maintained continuously but modified periodically (and locally), and it is not clear that 
modifications of different perceptual features are temporally co-ordinated. 
 
3.2: The cinematic theory of cognition 
 
 The cinematic theory of cognition was developed in several papers by Freeman and 
colleagues (principally Freeman, 2004, 2006; Kozma & Freeman, 2017). Here I shall focus 
mainly on the most recent version, by Kozma and Freeman (2017). The basis for the theory is 
the observation of large-scale co-ordination in cortical activity, manifested as cyclical periods 
of high amplitude (about 100 - 200 ms in duration) separated by brief episodes (~20 ms) of 
low analytic power, called null spikes. Null spikes does not mean that nothing is going on, 
only that neural activity is not co-ordinated. Kozma and Freeman argued that the high 
amplitude phases are metastable patterns carrying cognitive (or perceptual) content in the 
form of frames, while the low analytic power episodes mark breaks or "shutters" between 
successive frames. The shutters mark periods of receptivity to new input in which neurons 
process input individually: thus, frames of perception reflecting a synchronised, metastable 
representation are established, maintained for a brief period, and then replaced by new 
frames constructed by ordering the output of individual neurons. This is, of course, a greatly 
oversimplified rendition of the model. I am concerned mainly to get across the central 
contention of the model that perception proceeds in global frames separated by "shutters" in 
which perception is temporarily shut off and a new frame is in the process of construction. 
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Conscious percepts consist of frames separated by phase transitions between disordered and 
ordered activity. 
 The predictions of the model for the content of percepts are not entirely clear. The 
frame hypothesis seems to imply that each frame is a static representation, since it does not 
itself change until it is shut down and replaced. However, that need not be the case, because 
there could be a static representation of information about ongoing change. In that case, 
evidence for temporal discrimination on a time scale shorter than that of a frame need not be 
disconfirmatory for it because the temporal discrimination could be made in perceptual 
processing and then inserted as a piece of information into the frame currently under 
construction. 
 The authors did not discuss perception beyond claiming that the amplitude patterns 
are frames of cognition, and offered no evidence for the central claim about the frame-like 
nature of perception. For that reason it is difficult to know what sort of evidence would 
falsify the model. It would appear to be compatible with other interpretations, for example 
the attentive sampling interpretation under which attention waxes and wanes (in this case 
possibly to zero during the "shutter" periods) but percepts are maintained continuously. 
There are at least four problems that the model would have to address. 
 First, the frames identified by Kozma and Freeman have long durations, up to 200 
ms. It is not clear, therefore, how the model can accommodate the evidence of temporal 
discrimination thresholds on the order of 5 ms, which will be discussed in more detail in 
section 4.2. 
 Second, the long duration of frames reawakens the problem of jerkiness discussed in 
the introduction. As far as vision is concerned, the frame duration is far beyond the flicker 
fusion frequency, which would seem to imply some form of jerkiness representing the 
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transitions between frames. It is possible that the jerkiness could be obviated by some form 
of model-fitting that would interpolate links between one frame and the next: presumably 
those links would involve postdictive filling-in of the absence of information during the 
phase transition, so that the current frame always looks back and sees continuity with the 
previous frame (metaphorically speaking). At least, the account requires some sort of 
explanation for the absence of subjective jerkiness. 
 Third, the long frame duration of 100 - 200 ms is not confirmed by the results of a 
study by Pockett et al. (2011). Pockett et al. found periodic fluctuations in the brains of 
people who were awake but had no specific task to do, that did not occur in the brains of 
anaesthetized patients. Pockett et al. interpreted these in a way that is consonant with the 
cinematic theory of cognition, with short periods of minimal activity (null spikes) separating 
longer periods apparently representing large-scale co-ordination in activity. However, the 
periodicity was 50 - 100 ms. This difference in frame durations between what otherwise 
appear to be similar accounts and similar kinds of evidence needs to be explained. 
 Fourth, if the whole of perception proceeds in discrete frames, as the account seems 
to imply, then those frames would have to be maintained continuously during the waking 
state. There is no evidence for that: on the contrary, there is evidence that oscillations on the 
time scale proposed by the authors as marking frames do not occur continuously. A simple 
illustration is the study by Smith, Gosselin, and Schyns (2006) that will be discussed in the 
next section, showing that one version of a visual stimulus generated oscillations in the theta 
range and another generated oscillations in the beta range. I should also point to the evidence 
reviewed above that oscillation frequencies vary between modalities. 
 There is no reason to doubt that the oscillatory patterns described by Freeman and 
colleagues are pervasive and probably functionally important in information processing, but 
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there is as yet no clear evidence that the oscillatory patterns indicate cinematic frames of 
conscious perception, and there are several problems for that hypothesis to address. 
 
3.3: A broader look at EEG evidence 
 
 The two recent proposals discussed so far have both drawn on EEG evidence as 
support. Some authors additional to those discussed above have also proposed variants of the 
frame hypothesis based on regular oscillations (Joliot, Ribary, & Llinás, 1994; Lehmann, 
Faber, Gianotti, Kochi, & Pascual-Marqui, 2006; Lehmann, Ozaki, & Pal, 1987; Pockett et 
al., 2011). A thorough survey of EEG research is far beyond the scope of this paper: my aim 
is just to make a few observations that are of relevance to the discrete frame hypothesis. Is it 
possible that any kind of repeating pattern in EEG data could mark the occurrence of discrete 
frames of conscious perception? 
 One problem with assessing the status of EEG evidence with regard to the discrete 
frame hypothesis is that there are numerous other hypotheses about the functional 
significance of EEG waveforms. For example, many studies have shown that oscillations are 
associated with attentive processing, related to co-ordination of activity across different areas 
of the brain and temporal segmentation of the processing of stimulus information (e.g. 
Bazanova & Vernon, 2014; Doesburg, Roggeveen, Kitajo, & Ward, 2008; Hanslmayr, Gross, 
Klimesch, & Shapiro, 2011; Jensen, Gips, Bergmann, & Bonnefond, 2014; Klimesch, 2012; 
Lisman & Jensen, 2013; Mathewson, Lleras, Beck, Fabiani, Ro, & Gratton, 2011; Myers, 
Stokes, Walther, & Nobre, 2014; Roberts, Hsieh, & Ranganath, 2013; Tallon-Baudry, 2012; 
Walz, Goldman, Carapezza, Muraskin, Brown, & Sajda, 2015; Weisz, Hartmann, Muller, 
Lorenz, & Obleser, 2011). I shall briefly discuss two hypotheses, both concerning alpha. 
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 One hypothesis is the cortical excitability hypothesis mentioned in the section on 
early proposals. The functional interpretation of periodic fluctuations in cortical excitability 
is not fully understood, but I shall briefly mention one proposal for illustrative purposes. 
Lange, Keil, Schnitzler, van Dijk, and Weisz (2014) argued that cortical excitability affects 
stability of perceptions. Stability is high when alpha power is high and low when alpha 
power is low. In support of this they discussed a study by Strüber and Herrmann (2002) who 
used an alternating dot pattern that could give rise to a percept of either horizontal or vertical 
motion, and reversals in the direction of perceived motion occurred apparently 
spontaneously. Strüber and Herrmann found that perceptual reversal was more likely to occur 
when alpha power was low than when it was high. This suggests that stability is high when 
alpha power is high, and receptivity to new processing is higher when alpha power is low. 
This was specifically for endogenous (spontaneous) alpha, not for alpha triggered by the 
stimulus. Lange et al. argued that the results of several other studies in both vision and 
audition supported the perceptual stability hypothesis, including VanRullen et al. (2006). In 
effect, there is a trade-off between stability and precision in perception, and at states of high 
excitability (low alpha power) precision analysis dominates, resulting in increased likelihood 
of change in the percept, whether that change be improved accuracy or a perceptual reversal 
in an illusory bistable figure. 
 Another hypothesis is that alpha represents a periodic shift between attentive 
processing of relevant stimuli and active suppression of irrelevant stimuli, or prioritising 
stimuli for attentive processing (Gleiss & Kayser, 2014; Jensen, Bonnefond, & VanRullen, 
2012; Jensen et al., 2014; Payne & Sekuler, 2014). The amount of information in sensory 
input per unit time is far greater than the brain's capacity to process it, so information is 
selected according to processing priorities. This selection process involves suppression of 
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low priority information. The authors cited here have argued, in different ways, that 
selecting, prioritising, and suppressing information depending on relevance or importance is 
a function of alpha, and that the oscillation represents cycling between selecting relevant 
information and suppressing irrelevant information. 
 These hypotheses illustrate the general point that alpha is involved in maintenance 
and adjustment of percepts, such that changes are more likely to occur at some times than at 
others. Change is probabilistic: there is perhaps no time at which a percept cannot be 
changed, and no time at which change must always occur. This is consistent with the finding 
that the amount of variability in perception that is accounted for by oscillatory phase or 
power is small (VanRullen, 2016). The functional significance of oscillations can be 
elucidated without reference to discrete temporal frames of perception. That in itself is not 
sufficient to disprove the EEG version of the frame hypothesis, but the problems listed earlier 
render it unlikely to be correct. There are two more problems worthy of mention here, both 
concerned with the requirement that discrete frames of conscious experience should go on all 
the time in the waking state. 
 One problem is that, even within vision, alpha is not triggered by all kinds of stimuli. 
For example, Smith et al. (2006) made use of a painting with an ambiguous figure that gave 
rise to bistable perceptions. They created sparse versions of the painting by focussing on 
specific spatial frequency bandwidths and participants reported which, if either, perception 
occurred with each stimulus. Smith et al. found that theta waves (4 - 8 Hz) were associated 
with one perception of the figure and beta waves (12 - 25 Hz) were associated with the other. 
As was discussed in section 3.1.2, Ronconi et al. (2017) found that perception of one kind of 
visual stimulus could be predicted from the phase of alpha oscillation (8 - 10 Hz), but 
perception of another kind could be predicted from the phase of theta oscillation (6 - 7 Hz). 
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 Those studies serve to make some important points. In the Smith et al. study, neither 
of the observed frequencies was in the alpha band, thus showing that alpha does not occur in 
response to all visual stimuli. The results also show that there is no fixed periodic response to 
visual stimuli: the periodicity that occurred differed substantially depending on stimulus 
features, even when (in the Smith et al. study) the experimental stimuli were derived from the 
same painting. The theta waves observed in one condition do match the 7 Hz frequency that 
was interpreted by VanRullen and colleagues as indicating the rate of attentive sampling 
(VanRullen et al., 2007, 2014). However, if attentive sampling was occurring in response to 
both versions of the stimulus, as seems plausible, it is not clear why the 7 Hz oscillation was 
not found for the other version. The two studies show that different stimuli trigger 
oscillations with different frequencies, and that different oscillatory frequencies are 
functional for different perceptual phenomena. The exact functional significance of the 
oscillations is a topic that lies outside the remit of the present paper. For present purposes, the 
specificity of association of different oscillatory frequencies with different perceptual 
processing tasks is hard to reconcile with the frame hypothesis. 
 The other problem is that McComas and Cupido (1999) reported a finding that 
"approximately 10% of otherwise normal individuals appear to lack α-rhythms under any 
circumstances" (p. 1988). The empirical basis for this report is not clear and it should perhaps 
be regarded as in need of confirmation5, but, if valid, it would obviously rule out any 
hypothesis that alpha could be the basis of discrete temporal frames of perception. It would 
be valuable to discover whether there is any detectable difference in attentive processing of 
perceptual information between people who do and do not have alpha. In any case, as was 
noted earlier, alpha is suppressed when the eyes are opened (Bazanova & Vernon, 2014), yet 
there is no evident effect of that on conscious perception. 
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 Periodic fluctuations in neural activity revealed by EEG waveforms are widespread 
and occur on multiple time scales, and it is likely that they subserve multiple functions in 
information processing. However, there is no clear evidence that those functions include 
constructing discrete frames of conscious perception. Indeed, it is not clear what sort of 
evidence would support such a hypothesis. Fluctuations in attention go on at a level below 
that of conscious perception and are compatible with continuity of maintenance and change 
in conscious perception. And there is no proof that any oscillation, whether endogenous or 
stimulus-triggered, goes on everywhere and all the time in the waking state. The oscillations 
observed by Pockett et al. (2011) and by Freeman and colleagues (Kozma & Freeman, 2017) 
may go on all the time and may be specific to the waking state, but it has not been established 
that they are connected with conscious perception, and they could relate to some function 
outside of conscious perception. There could be local, transient discrete frames associated 
with particular processes or functions, although again there is no clear evidence for such a 
thing. If that were the case, then one could imagine conscious perception as a concatenated 
set of local frames starting and stopping and with different and variable periodicities. Even 
then, the evidence favours the hypothesis that fluctuations are a matter of degree, and are not 
like on/off switches. Attention does not switch on and off seven times a second; instead, its 
level of activation varies in a continuous and periodic way (e.g. Landau & Fries, 2012). New 
information is more likely to be registered at some times than at others; change to a percept is 
more likely to occur at some times than at others. That is, perhaps, as close to discrete frames 
as EEG oscillations get. 
 There are clearly many hypotheses about the functional significance of EEG 
oscillations that do not require reference to discrete frames. However, as I observed when 
reviewing research on the attentive sampling hypothesis, the processes that operate cyclically 
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go on behind perceptual experience rather than in it. For example, a particular percept of an 
ambiguous bistable figure, such as the alternating dot pattern used by Strüber and Herrmann 
(2002), is maintained continuously over a period of a few seconds, while beneath it alpha of 
gradually decreasing power is occurring. The likelihood of a switch in perception increases 
as alpha power decreases, but the effect of periodicity is to alter the probability of a switch in 
a specific percept at any given time, not to make perception progress in a series of discrete 
frames. 
 At present, then, the hypothesis of local discrete frames of perception marked by 
periodicities in EEG is not disconfirmed, but the evidence does not strongly favour it, there 
are several problems for it, and there are many alternative hypotheses about the functional 
significance of EEG periodicities that do not call on the notion of discrete frames. Terms like 
"blinking spotlight" (VanRullen et al., 2007), "perceptual echoes" (VanRullen & Macdonald, 
2012), and "ringing" (Harter, 1967) are rhetorical devices that attract the reader's mind to a 
clear and definite image of what is going on, and it is then hard to let go of that image and 
perceive the rather murkier reality that lies in the results. 
 
3.4: Pre-semantically defined temporal windows 
 
 Pöppel (1997, 2009; Pöppel, Schill, & von Steinbüchel, 1990) argued that system states 
with a duration of ~30 ms are units of temporal experience: events occurring within a 30 ms 
period are experienced as contemporaneous, and successions of such states give rise to the 
experience of successiveness. A stimulus gives rise to a neuronal oscillation with a frequency of 
30 ms (30 Hz), which subserves inter-modal integration. Events within the same oscillatory 
cycle as the stimulus are experienced as contemporaneous with it, and events outside that cycle 
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are experienced as successive. Pöppel drew on several lines of research to show that the 30 ms 
period is a general feature of brain activity, and that is the evidence that will be evaluated here. 
 A key feature of the argument is that the critical duration of 30 ms should be detectable 
across sensory modalities. Pöppel (1997, 2009) cited research on temporal order judgment by 
Hirsh and Sherrick (1961) as supporting similar temporal thresholds for visual, auditory, and 
tactile stimuli. Hirsh and Sherrick did find similar relations between temporal difference and 
accuracy of temporal order judgment for all three modalities, but they reported that the 
difference at which judgments were 75% correct (their chosen criterion) was 20 ms, not 30 ms. 
Also, the line relating time difference to accuracy of judgment was straight to a good 
approximation across the range of differences studied, which means that the critical duration 
depends on the criterion level of accuracy set by the researchers. If the criterion was set at 90%, 
for example, the critical duration would be 40 ms. Pöppel (2009) cited Kanabus, Szeląg, Rojek, 
and Pöppel (2002) as supporting similar temporal thresholds for visual and auditory temporal 
order judgment. By the criterion they set, which was 75% correct responding, both visual and 
auditory time differences had to be >40 ms before accurate responding was achieved. However, 
performance on auditory stimuli was superior to that on visual stimuli at all durations from 5 ms 
to 40 ms, and was consistently better than chance (between 60 % and 75% correct). Furthermore, 
performance in both modalities continued to improve up to asymptote at approximately 150 ms. 
There are certainly similarities in the level of accuracy of temporal order judgment across the 
three modalities of vision, audition, and touch, but the studies do not indicate that there is 
anything special about 30 ms. As will be shown in section 4.2, there is evidence for a great range 
of temporal discrimination thresholds, and no evidence for a peak around 30 ms. 
 Madler and Pöppel (1987) presented auditory clicks to patients while the patients were 
awake and while under general anaesthesia. They found a periodicity of 25 ms in auditory 
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evoked potentials for awake patients, but no periodicity for anaesthetised patients. This does 
suggest a temporal unit of experience because it does not occur under anaesthesia. However, 
other studies have found different periodicities under similar circumstances, either comparing 
awake with unconscious patients (50 - 100 ms; Pockett et al., 2011) or studying participants who 
were awake but relaxing with eyes closed (50 ms; Lehmann, 1971). Neither result is consistent 
with what Madler and Pöppel (1987) found. It is likely that their result reflects something 
specific to auditory processing, but without further research this cannot be certain. 
 Pöppel (1997, 2009) reported research supporting the 30 ms unit on choice reaction 
times. Pöppel (1970) studied choice reaction times for both visual and auditory stimuli and found 
multimodal distributions of response times with a period of 30 ms. The method of that study and 
others has been criticised (Vorberg & Schwartz, 1987; Vroon, 1970, 1974). Vorberg and 
Schwartz (1987) demonstrated that an appearance of regular oscillations can occur in data 
distributions by chance and there is no clear evidence that the distributions obtained by Pöppel 
(1970) were not chance phenomena. They argued that the analysis requires a data sample size at 
least 50 times greater than that obtained by Pöppel (1970). Vroon (1974) generated 1,200 values 
for time estimates constrained to have a normal distribution but with noise fluctuations. Vroon 
showed that, if the estimates were assigned to bins with durations of 30 ms, strong peaks 
emerged around 45 ms and 90 ms, despite the fact that the data were essentially random. This 
suggests that apparent periodicities obtained from data sets that are not much larger than that 
cannot be trusted to reveal psychologically meaningful periodicities. Following this, Jokeit 
(1990) ran a more systematic analysis of reaction time data and found a basic period of 10 ms. 
There was also evidence for a minor peak between about 20 ms and 40 ms, but it was much 
smaller. 
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 Other studies have found different periodicities in reaction time data. Harter and White 
(1968) found periods of 25 ms and 65 ms for both visual and auditory stimuli. Latour (1967) 
studied eye movement reaction times to visual stimuli and found periodicity of 14.5 ms in right 
to left movement and 9.7 ms in left to right movement. Venables (1960) studied reaction times to 
visual stimuli and found periodicity of 10 ms for the people with schizophrenia and 20 ms for 
those without. Ilmberger (1986) studied choice reaction times to acoustic stimuli and reported a 
series of modes separated by intervals of 40 ms. Dehaene (1993) found various periodicities 
ranging from 10.2 ms to 36.6 ms, depending in part on task complexity. So, if there are 
meaningful periodicities in reaction times, they vary considerably, probably as a function of the 
particular task set and of its complexity. 
 Finally, Pöppel (1997, 2009) called on a study by Pöppel and Logothetis (1986) of 
response latency in smooth pursuit eye movements. The results showed peaks in the histogram 
of response latency that were approximately 30 - 40 ms apart. However, there are some problems 
with the study. The authors varied target velocity between 1 and 10 deg s-1 but only reported 
results for 6 deg s-1, so it is not clear whether the same periodicity was found at the other target 
velocities. There were only four or possibly five peaks in the data, and it is hard to assess the 
probability of that small number occurring by chance (Vorberg & Schwartz, 1987). At 6 deg s-1 
there were 462 data points that were collected in bins of 10 ms, but the temporal resolution of the 
measure of response latency was 3 ms, so it is not clear why a bin size of 10 ms was chosen. 
Vroon (1970) showed that peaks occur at different places depending on bin size, even for the 
same set of data, and the simulation run by Vroon (1974) shows that 462 data points is far too 
few for meaningful results to be obtained. In short, there are too many degrees of freedom in the 
data analysis, and there is a need for replication with more systematic analysis and a much larger 
set of data. 
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 In summary, some of the evidence is of questionable validity and the rest does not fit 
with the prediction of a significant concentration of findings around 30 ms, so it can be 
concluded that the hypothesized 30 ms unit of temporal experience lacks support. 
 
3.5: The time quantum model 
 
 The time quantum model is a proposal that brain activity is temporally organised in the 
form of oscillatory or cyclic carrier processes (Geissler & Kompass, 2001; Geissler, Schebera, & 
Kompass, 1999) According to Geissler et al. (1999), "quantal timing represents a tool for the 
brain to ensure fast, temporally extremely precise communication among neural units that, 
depending on their function and phylogenetic origin, may differ widely in their temporal 
characteristics" (p. 708). They argued that there is an overall coherence of activity in the brain 
due to phase-locking between cycles that have different periods. The function of frames, 
therefore, is to promote coherence in brain activity. There is a fundamental oscillatory frequency 
of 4.5 - 4.6 ms (in fact precisely 4.57 ms according to Geissler et al., 1999), which they called a 
time quantum, and other activities operate on time scales that are multiples of the time quantum, 
thereby facilitating phase-locking. For example, they argued that there was evidence for two 
critical periodicities of 55 ms and 111 ms, which are 12 and 24 times, respectively, the length of 
the base unit. Different periods (as multiples of the base period of the time quantum) emerge 
depending on task and stimulus conditions. 
 The time quantum model itself cannot be fully reviewed here (see Geissler & Kompass, 
2001, and Geissler et al., 1999, for more detailed exposition). However, the prediction of a 
fundamental frame duration of 4.57 ms and of the temporal organisation of brain activity in 
multiples of the time quantum can be tested, and evidence relevant to that is assessed here. 
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 The findings cited by Geissler and Kompass (2001) as support for this proposal were 
from some studies of stimulus discrimination thresholds (Brecher, 1932; von Békésy, 1936), and 
a series of studies on successiveness discrimination thresholds by Kristofferson (Kristofferson, 
1967a, 1967b, 1980, 1984). Examination of those studies shows that the range of variation in 
thresholds is too great to support any specific conclusion about time quanta. For example, 
Kristofferson (1967a) reported a mean successiveness discrimination threshold of 48 ms, but 
means for individual participants varied from 40 to 60 ms. In Kristofferson (1967b), the reported 
mean was 54 ms with a range across individuals from 33 to 77 ms. Neither 48 nor 54 is an exact 
multiple of 4.57. The data from individuals show too much variability to support the hypothesis 
of a time quantum of 4.57 ms. Moreover, in later research Kristofferson (1984) reported much 
greater variation and favoured a model in which the critical durations were a function of 
doubling from a base quantum of 12.5 ms (though this was put forward just as a model of 
duration or successiveness discrimination and not as a discrete frame hypothesis): 12.5 is not a 
multiple of 4.6. Matthews and Grondin (2012) failed to replicate some of the time quantum 
values that Kristofferson (1980) reported. Many of the studies discussed in section 3.4 found 
evidence for periods that are not exact multiples of 4.57. To give just one example, the 10.2 ms 
period found by Dehaene (1993) is 2.2 x 4.57, and that is only one of several periods found in 
that study. 
 The study by Geissler et al. (1999) was concerned with apparent motion, specifically 
what is called long-range beta motion. Beta motion is the apparent motion that is perceived 
between two spatially separated and temporally successive flashes of light, and long-range beta 
motion occurs with angular separations > 2°. The design manipulated exposure duration and 
angular separation. The procedure was that the ISI was gradually reduced for a given stimulus 
until the participant reported that apparent motion had ceased. A histogram showed statistically 
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significant peaks in the response distribution for ISI values of 9, 22, 27, 43, 55, and 107 ms. 
Dividing each of these by the hypothesized time quantum value of 4.57 ms should yield a close 
approximation to a whole number. In fact the results of division by 4.57 are, respectively, 1.97, 
4.81, 5.91, 9.41, 12.04, and 23.41. There are, therefore, close matches for three of the six 
durations. There are in addition seventeen other multiples of 4.57 between 0 and 107 ms, for 
which peaks were not found, including 4.57 ms itself: there is no peak at either 4 or 5 ms. 
Overall, this cannot be regarded as strong support for the time quantum model. 
 The brief but penetrating methodological critiques by Vorberg and Schwartz (1987) and 
Vroon (1970, 1974) should be borne in mind in relation to much of the literature discussed in 
this subsection: very large data samples and analytic procedures that are fixed before data 
collection are the minimum requirement, as indeed is investigation of the roles of task content 
and complexity. 
 Geissler et al. (1999) argued that temporal discrimination thresholds, including 
nonsimultaneity and temporal order thresholds, are phenomena where critical periods ought to 
match multiples of the time quantum. I have recently carried out a systematic survey of studies 
of temporal discrimination thresholds (White, 2018), which involved the construction of a large 
table of research findings. I examined the table to see how many of the mean threshold values 
reported matched multiples of the time quantum. I allowed a match to count if the mean divided 
by the time quantum value of 4.57 was within ± 0.1 of a whole number. This gives a chance 
expectation of matches in 20% of values. The first point to note is that many threshold values 
reported were less than 4.57 ms, and therefore cannot be explained by the time quantum model 
(Elhilali, Ma, Micheyi, Oxenham, & Shamma, 2009; Heinrich, de la Rosa, & Schneider, 2014; 
Heinrich & Schneider, 2006; Lackner & Teuber, 1973; Leshowitz, 1971; Lotze, Wittmann, von 
Steinbüchel, Pöppel, & Roenneberg, 1999; Pichora-Fuller, Schneider, Benson, Hamstra, & 
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Storzer, 2006; Wiegrebe & Krumbholz, 1999; Zera & Green, 1993). In addition to those just 
cited, a large number of studies have replicated the same finding of an auditory gap detection 
threshold of about 2 ms (White, 2018). The second point to note is that many of the studies 
included in the table reported a range of discrimination thresholds dependent on the independent 
variables in the study in question, and those were excluded from the present calculation. For the 
remander, 15 out of 81 findings were a match. This is a match rate of 18.5%, which is close to, 
and certainly not more than, the chance expectation. It could be argued that individual responses, 
not means, should be the units of analysis. However, individual responses should certainly 
converge on means that match the critical periods, so the fact that there is no evidence for that in 
a survey of 81 studies carries some disconfirmatory weight. 
 In summary, the evidence reviewed here, which includes a very large survey of temporal 
discrimination thresholds encompassing vast quantities of data, gives no support to the proposed 
time quantum. 
 
3.6: Time chunks 
 
 McComas and Cupido (1999) reported evidence that successive somatosensory 
(electrical) stimuli are only perceived as two stimuli if the ISI exceeds 50 ms. They referred to 
other evidence which, they claimed, supported the idea of time chunks on a time scale of ~50 ms 
(Andrews, White, Binder, & Purves, 1996; Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961; Marks, Girvin, O'Keefe, 
Ning, Quest, Antunes, & Dobelle, 1982; Purves et al., 1996). 
 To explain this, they proposed that information processing in the sensory cortex occurs in 
chunks of time. They pointed to research involving intracellular recordings of responses to 
somatosensory stimuli. These showed a consistent temporal pattern: an initial excitatory 
Discrete temporal frames 
53 
response followed by a prolonged inhibitory postsynaptic potential, which was in turn followed 
by a rebound excitation. Both the initial excitatory response and the later rebound response were 
capable of generating action potentials. They argued that a time chunk corresponded to one of 
these sequences. They also argued that a different kind of cell, pyramidal cells in layers 2 and 3 
of the sensory cortex, has properties that make them suitable for the function of storing 
information for the duration of a time chunk. This would subserve integration across the duration 
of a time chunk to generate a unified percept, which involves a further layer of cells reading out 
the states of the pyramidal cells. This is a very schematic summary of their model; for more 
detail, see McComas and Cupido (1999). 
 The model proposed by McComas and Cupido (1999) addresses some critical problems 
for a discrete frame hypothesis, principally concerning how information can be stored and 
integrated over the duration of a frame, and how input is tranformed into a percept through a 
series of processing stages. However, although they used the term "time chunk" and argued that 
their model might capture processing in general across the sensory cortex, it is not clear that the 
model generates a discrete frame for the whole of conscious perception. The initial response is 
stimulus-driven: "the initial... stimulus starts a time chunk" (p. 1991). This suggests that time 
chunks are triggered by specific stimuli. In fact the key evidence that the proposed mechanism is 
supposed to explain is evidence on temporal discrimination thresholds: stimuli are perceived as 
two stimuli when they are sufficiently far apart in time to fall into separate time chunks, and they 
are integrated into a single percept when the interval between them is less than that of a time 
chunk. It is likely, therefore, that time chunks would be local phenomena, meaning in this case 
that they would not be co-ordinated across large areas of conscious perception. 
 Temporal discrimination thresholds vary greatly not only between but also within 
modalities (see section 4.2). Even in the few studies cited by McComas and Cupido (1999) there 
Discrete temporal frames 
54 
is a wide range of variation, from ~20 ms (Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961) to over 1,000 ms (Marks et 
al., 1982). Some of this variation may be due to operating characteristics of peripheral sensors 
(Marks et al., 1982), but it is likely that the model would have to be adaptable to a range of time 
scales in cortical processing if it is to work as a general account of temporal discrimination. 
Also, although the cells they discuss have properties that are suitable for the proposed functions, 
there is no compelling evidence that the cells actually do have those functions, so the account is 
somewhat speculative. On the other hand, it is an attempt to root a discrete frame proposal in a 
neurophysiologically plausible model, something that is found in few other proposals. However, 
there does not appear to have been any further development or testing of the model. 
 
3.7: Snapshots (Crick & Koch, 2003) 
 
 Crick and Koch (2003) proposed an approach to the understanding of consciousness in 
terms of the neural correlates of consciousness, combining ten different issues in an attempt to 
construct a coherent overall view of the phenomenon. One of these ten issues was their snapshot 
hypothesis: "We propose that conscious awareness (for vision) is a series of static snapshots, 
with motion 'painted' on them... By this we mean that perception occurs in discrete epochs" (p. 
122). The phrase "static snapshot" seems to imply the lack of experienced temporality that is 
sometimes considered a defining feature of discrete frames. This is, therefore, a discrete frame 
hypothesis specific to vision, but apparently applying to the whole of vision. This must be 
qualified, however, by their comment that "[t]he durations of successive snapshots are unlikely 
to be constant" (p. 122), and by their further comment that "the time of a snapshot for shape, say, 
may not exactly coincide with that for, say, color" (p. 122). In their account, when neural activity 
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for a feature crosses some sort of threshold, it is held there for a certain time, and that time is the 
time of the snapshot. 
 It is not within the remit of this paper to evaluate their proposals about consciousness as a 
whole: the concern is purely with the "snapshot" model of conscious visual percepts. As it 
stands, the proposal is difficult to evaluate because the duration, or range of durations, of 
snapshots is not specified, except for a suggestion that they might relate to alpha or delta 
oscillations. No supporting evidence for the snapshot proposal is cited. Also, the suggestion that 
the duration of a snapshot may vary, without any proposal as to the extent of the variation or the 
factors that might affect it, makes the proposal hard to falsify. Exactly what it means for motion 
to be "painted" onto a snapshot is not clear. It is possible to imagine that there are motion 
detectors in perceptual processing and that information about motion generated by those 
detectors is held in static form in a snapshot, but there is a need for further specification of the 
mechanisms that accomplish that. As it stands, the "static snapshot" view of discrete frames falls 
victim to the rapid akinetopsia problem discussed earlier: to perceive any kind of change, there 
must be some sort of integration across the contents of consecutive frames, and there must be 
some sort of perceptual product of that. That integration and its product would be hard to 
reconcile with the frame hypothesis. This will be further discussed in the general considerations 
section. 
 
3.8: The interoceptive specious moment (Craig, 2009a, 2009b) 
 
 Interoception concerns all central processing of information from the body's internal 
sensors. Craig (2009b) listed many different kinds of interoceptive stimuli, among which are 
such things as pain, articular kinaesthesis, thirst, distension of the bladder, some components of 
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emotional feelings such as disgust, awareness of the heartbeat, and input from receptors on or 
near the surface of the skin, such as thermoception. In some cases the interoceptive input may be 
a contributor to an experience rather than the sole determinant of it; this is perhaps especially the 
case with emotions, which have a cognitive component as well as an interoceptive one. 
However, the full list in Craig (2009b) makes it clear that interoception is a major and perhaps 
neglected component of conscious perception. Craig (2009a, 2009b) argued that interoceptive 
input, processed mainly in the anterior insular cortex (AIC), is a major contributor to the sense of 
self. For present purposes, however, the concern is just with the proposal of a global "specious 
moment" (Craig, 2009a, p. 1933) comprising the whole set of cortically processed interoceptive 
sensations at a given time, including the sense of a self that has those sensations. 
 Craig (2009a, 2009b) proposed that the global interoceptive representation is temporally 
structured as a series of moments, and that a memorial representation across a series of such 
moments provides a basis for experienced emotional (or, more generally, interoceptively self-
related) continuity over time. Continuity is generated by comparisons over time (including 
anticipated future states) utilising information about previous moments held in storage buffers. It 
is not clear how a moment is defined in this model, but it seems to represent a time scale of 
integration across all interoception. That time scale is about 125 ms. To support this, Craig 
(2009a, 2009b) referred to a few studies relating temporal discrimination to activity in the AIC. 
 One of those studies was by Kranczioch, Debener, Schwarzbach, Goebel, and Engel 
(2005), in which participants attempted to detect visual targets in a rapid series of stimuli. When 
the latency between targets was 100 or 200 ms, detection rate of the second target was low. This 
indicates an "attentional blink" phenomenon in which attention appears to be transiently reduced 
following detection of the first target. The study found evidence of activation in the AIC and 
other areas when the second target was detected at that latency but not when it was not. Craig 
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(2009a, 2009b) interpreted this as indicating the temporal resolution of the AIC, and therefore of 
the specious moment. It is doubtful whether the findings can be interpreted that way, however. 
There is a substantial literature on the attentional blink, and there is general agreement that it 
occurs for a stimulus that is presented in the period about 200 - 500 ms after an initial stimulus 
(Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Dux & Marois, 2009; Martens & Wyble, 2010; Raymond, 
Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; Reeves & Sperling, 1986). The results obtained by Kranczioch et al. 
(2005) are exceptional in that respect. In addition, although many explanations have been 
proposed for the attentional blink, most focus on the period in which perceptual information is 
being consolidated into working memory (Dux & Marois, 2009). Dux and Marois (2009) 
concluded from their review that the attentional blink "reflects the competition between targets 
for attentional resources, not only for working memory encoding, episodic registration and 
response selection..., but also for the enhancement of target representations and the inhibition of 
distractors" (p. 1696). Therefore, not only does the time scale of the phenomenon not fit with 
Craig's proposal, it is not connected with conscious perception at all, but occurs at a subsequent 
stage of processing, that of memory consolidation. 
 Craig (2009b) stated: "Psychophysical data from rapid-visual-search studies suggest that 
the maximal rate of passage of individual moments is ~8 Hz" (p. 68). The only study cited in 
support of that claim was by Deary, Simonotto, Meyer, Marshall, A., Marshall, M., Goddard, 
and Wardlaw (2004), who ran a line length discrimination study in which stimulus presentation 
time was manipulated. Performance declined from nearly perfect at 150 ms presentation to close 
to chance at 6 ms presentation. The authors reported increased activation in several brain areas 
as difficulty increased, including the AIC. Deary et al. suggested a functional role for the insular 
areas associated with effort in relation to stimulus complexity, task difficulty, or degraded 
percepts. It is not clear, however, that the results have implications for the duration of a specious 
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moment. On the contrary, the results suggest that the AIC is involved with effortful processing 
of stimuli presented on a much shorter time scale than the proposed 125 ms. Nor is it clear what 
the basis for the claim of an 8 Hz (125 ms) moment is: the psychophysical results show that 
performance was close to ceiling at 75 ms stimulus presentation time, and did not change 
significantly as presentation time increased beyond that.  
 Craig (2009a) reviewed research evidence indicating a role for the AIC in time 
perception, but that role has no necessary connection with a frame hypothesis. As things stand, 
therefore, the hypothesis of a temporal frame of 125 ms in interoception, or indeed in effortful or 
attentive processing in general, lacks supporting evidence.  
 
4: General considerations 
 
4.1: Evidence 
 
 It is evident that the hypothesized duration of a discrete frame varies greatly between 
proposals, as shown in Table 2. This alone should suffice to raise a warning flag. What makes 
one proposal better than the others? In fact, as this review has shown, none of the proposals is 
strongly supported by evidence. The authors of the proposals have called upon evidence that is 
consistent with the frame duration they have proposed, but have paid little or no attention to the 
evidence that supports the frame durations proposed by others. This is possibly symptomatic of a 
general contemporary problem. There is such a superabundance of research evidence in 
psychology and neuroscience now that a tendency to focus on supportive evidence and to ignore 
disconfirmatory or inconsistent evidence is all too easily accommodated. Nobody can have a 
thorough working knowledge of all the relevant evidence, and new evidence accumulates faster 
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than anyone can realistically absorb it. In this section some additional problems that have 
relevance for all discrete frame hypotheses are discussed. 
 Most of the evidence reviewed here falls into one of three categories. First, there is 
evidence that is better interpreted as the product of local processing and that, therefore, does not 
speak to the discrete frame hypothesis. This includes perceived shrinkage of arcs and other 
figures (Ansbacher, 1944), the effect of delay on visual impressions of causality (Michotte, 1963; 
Shallice, 1964), periodic adjustments to pointing movements (Bertelson, 1966; Craik, 1947), the 
continuous wagon wheel illusion (VanRullen et al., 2005), visual trails (Dubois & VanRullen, 
2011), temporal discrimination thresholds (Pöppel, 1997, 2009), and research on the attentional 
blink (Craig, 2009a, 2009b). Second, there is evidence that is of dubious validity. This includes 
studies of reaction times and supposed stepwise functions in perceptual judgment (e.g. Geissler 
et al., 1999; Pöppel, 1970; von Békésy, 1936) that were critically evaluated by Vorberg and 
Schwartz (1987) and Vroon (1970, 1974). The third and most problematic category is evidence 
that relates to periodicity in perceptual or attentive processing. This is best treated in the context 
of theoretical propoals about frame generation. 
 
4.1.1: Mechanisms for generating frames, and the periodicity issue 
 
 There have been several proposals for mechanisms that would generate or exhibit regular 
or semi-regular peridocity, and could therefore be responsible for discrete frames: scanning 
cycles (Pitts & McCulloch, 1947); cortical excitability cycles (Harter, 1967; Lindsley, 1952); 
central and perceptual intermittency (Craik, 1947; Harter, 1967; Kristofferson, 1967a); attention-
based periodic sampling (VanRullen, 2016; VanRullen & Koch, 2003; VanRullen et al., 2014); 
null spikes as shutters (Freeman, 2004, 2006; Kozma & Freeman, 2017; Pockett et al., 2011); 
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neuronal oscillations subserving inter-modal integration (Pöppel, 1997, 2009); phase-locking of 
oscillatory cycles (Geissler & Kompass, 2001); and the excitatory/inhibitory/rebound neural 
response cycle (McComas & Cupido, 1999). The evidence called upon to support these 
hypothesized mechanisms has included evidence concerning the functional significance of EEG 
waveforms, originating with Bishop (1932) and continuing to recent work on attention switching 
(VanRullen, 2016; VanRullen et al., 2014), the so-called "perceptual echoes" (VanRullen & 
Macdonald, 2012), and other research on the functional significance of alpha (e.g. Jensen et al., 
2014; Lange et al., 2014). There is little doubt that EEG waveforms are indicators of large-scale 
co-ordination in neural activity, and that some of that is related to attentive processing, such as 
switching between maintenance and adjustment of perceptual information. I reviewed some 
problems for that evidence in relation to the discrete frame hypothesis earlier, but there are two 
points that need to be reiterated and developed here. 
 One issue relating to the proposed mechanisms concerns whether they generate 
frames in conscious perception, or whether they represent periodic activities in perceptual 
processing prior to the emergence of conscious percepts, that do not carry over to set the 
characteristics of conscious perception itself. To illustrate, one possible hypothesis about 
conscious percepts is that they are locally maintained as they are until change is detected  
(Galletti & Fattori, 2003; Nortmann, Rekauzke, Onat, König, & Jancke, 2015), and then they 
are locally updated. I emphasize the word "locally" because it is most likely that that is how 
an updating mechanism based on change detection would operate. Under such an account, it 
is also possible that some or even all of perceptual processing exhibits periodicity in 
accordance with one or another of the proposed mechanisms. In that case, change is more 
likely to be detected at some times (e.g. phases of a cycle of activity) than at others. 
However, because the mechanisms are functionally separate, there need be little or no overall 
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co-ordination in the temporal features of their activities. Thus, even though updating to a 
conscious percept may be affected by the cyclic activity of the process that generates the 
update, this would not impose a frame-like character on conscious perception. Perceptual 
processing would result in local updating occurring as quickly as possible, given the 
operating constraints. 
 I emphasize the illustrative nature of this: the change detection hypothesis is one 
among many possible hypotheses about how conscious percepts are constructed. The point is 
just to show that periodicity in mechanisms that generate conscious percepts does not 
necessarily generate periodicity in conscious percepts themselves. No hypothesized 
mechanism has yet been clearly established as a generator of discrete frames in conscious 
perception, as opposed to generating periodicity in the operation of (local) perceptual 
processing. 
 The other point is that periodicity does not imply discrete frames. We have seen, for 
example, that periodicity in attentive sampling is a matter of degree: attention does not switch on 
and off every 100 - 140 ms, but waxes and wanes on that time scale (VanRullen, 2016). The 
functional significance of periodic waxing and waning of attentive processing is still a matter of 
contention, but the case for supposing that attentive sampling is actually discrete, as opposed to 
just being stronger at some times than at others, is far from compelling. Second, it is not clear 
that a waxing and waning attentive process would generate experienced contemporaneity. On the 
contrary, it would seem more suited to generating information about change, which involves 
temporal succession, by periodically updating perceptual information. An obvious example here 
is a comparator process, which compares input information to an existing representation and 
detects discrepancies (e.g. Blakemore, 2003; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Fourneret & 
Jeannerod, 1998). This clearly does not involve experienced contemporaneity; instead, it 
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involves ascertaining that something has changed, which requires information about differences 
between one point in time and another. Thus, just postulating an information processing function 
for periodic oscillations in neural activity is not enough to support a discrete frame hypothesis: it 
has to be shown that discrete frames are produced by such oscillations. 
 In summary, the evidence of periodicity does not show discrete frames marked by clear, 
all-or-nothing boundaries. Instead, there are fluctuations that are matters of degree, that operate 
on different time scales, that are stimulus-driven rather than endogenous, and that do not occur 
all the time. Thus, some of what gets into conscious perception is the product of processing that 
shows periodic variability, but that is not the same as saying that conscious perception consists of 
discrete frames.  
 
4.1.2: Disconfirmatory evidence 
 
 There are findings that disconfirm predictions of discrete frame hypotheses. In addition to 
problems posed by research on temporal discrimination and temporal integration, which will be 
discussed in the next two sections, the most important findings both concern visible persistence. 
Several studies have shown that the duration of visible persistence varies inversely with stimulus 
duration, being maximal with stroboscopically presented stimuli and completely absent with 
stimulus durations longer than 100 - 130 ms (Di Lollo, 1977; Efron, 1970a, 1970b). Efron and 
Lee (1971) presented a radial line on a rotating disc that was intermittently stroboscopically 
illuminated. Suppose that visible persistence has a duration of 100 ms and that illumination 
occurs every 50 ms. In that case, two lines should be visible because the percept under the first 
flash has visible persistence that overlaps with the time of the second flash, but not with that of 
the third flash. It can be seen that the number of lines that are perceived as simultaneously 
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present depends on the interval between flashes, other things being equal. Efron and Lee (1971) 
confirmed this and showed that the function relating interval between flashes and number of 
lines reported as simultaneous was a straight line, indicating a continuously variable function. 
They also found that the duration of persistence varied with level of illumination. Under the 
discrete frame hypothesis, the number of lines visible at any time depends just on the number of 
flashes that occur in a single frame. If a frame has a fixed duration, then that number will show a 
stepwise function, not a continuous one. So, as Efron and Lee argued, to mantain the frame 
hypothesis, the duration of a frame "would have to vary as a complex function of stimulus 
luminance, wavelength, state of adaptation, and so on" (p. 374). In other words, it makes more 
sense to interpret the results as showing that percepts are updated continuously, to the limits of 
measurement, and not in discrete frames. 
 A study by Di Lollo and Wilson (1978) added further disconfirmatory evidence. They 
presented a 5 x 5 grid and briefly flashed 24 dots. Participants had to indicate which grid location  
did not have a dot in it. The stimuli were presented in three brief flashes, A, B, and C. In all 
stimuli flash C occurred after flashes A and B, with gaps of 10 ms from the termination of flash 
A and 20 ms from the termination of flash B. The duration of flash A was manipulated by 
altering its onset time relative to the other stimuli. Under discrete frame hypotheses, the 
probability of integrating the information in all three flashes and correctly identifying the 
missing dot depends on the probability that all flashes occur in the same discrete frame. This is 
determined just by the intervals between the termination of flashes A and B and the onset of 
flash C: that is, it is constant for all stimuli. The discrete frame hypothesis therefore predicts that 
there should be no effect of manipulating the onset time of flash A. Contrary to that, Di Lollo 
and Wilson found that the probability of incorrectly identifying as missing one of the dots in 
flash A increased as the duration of flash A increased. The explanation for this is the 
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aforementioned finding that visible persistence descreases to zero as the duration of a stimulus 
increases up to 100 ms. Thus, at long durations of flash A, there is no visible persistence and the 
dots in flash A cannot be integrated with those in flash C. 
 It is hard to see how the findings of the studies by Efron and Lee (1971) and Di Lollo and 
Wilson (1978) can be reconciled with the discrete frame hypothesis, but clearly there is a need 
for further research. 
 
4.2: Temporal discrimination 
 
 As I stated in the introduction, frames of conscious perception are commonly defined, at 
least in part, in terms of experienced contemporaneity: all events in a single frame are 
experienced as contemporaneous, or there is zero subjective duration, so that no happening, 
change, or motion is registered on the time scale of a single frame. If that is the case, then the 
maximum time span of a frame is set by the threshold of experienced nonsimultaneity. If two 
events separated by n ms are (reportably) experienced as occurring at different times, then they 
must fall into different frames. If any change is detected on a time scale of n ms, then that time 
scale must encompass more than one frame. 
 By that criterion, the maximum possible time span of a frame is very short. Several 
studies have found experienced nonsimultaneity for events separated by less than 6 ms, in vision 
(Sweet, 1953; Wehrhahn & Rapf, 1992; Westheimer & McKee, 1977), audition (Babkoff & 
Sutton, 1963; Elhilali et al., 2009; Fostick & Babkoff, 2013; Miller & Taylor, 1948; Wiegrebe & 
Krumbholz, 1999), and somatosensation (Miyazaki, Kadota, Matsuzaki, Takeuchi, Sekiguchi, 
Aoyama, & Kochiyama, 2016). In some studies, very fine temporal discriminations have been 
found but it is not clear that a subjective impression of nonsimultaneity, or even of two distinct 
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stimuli, has occurred; instead, the discrimination may be based on detectable qualititative 
differences in percepts (e.g. Henning & Gaskell, 1981). In the other studies cited here, however, 
the evidence for a genuine percept of temporal difference is strong. 
 The only way to save the frame hypothesis in the face of this evidence is to abandon the 
definition in terms of experienced simultaneity. An alternative possibility would be to define a 
frame in terms of updating frequency. A frame would contain an unchanging representation of 
informational states, and those states could include information about nonsimultaneity. For 
example, a process could generate the information that two stimuli, A and B, occurred at 
different times, such as 5 ms apart. That information could be entered as part of the content of a 
single frame, where it would remain for the duration of that frame. Thus, the information content 
of a single frame would be static, but it would include information about nonsimultaneity. One 
advantage of a static frame would be increased accessibility to further processing. If information 
that two stimuli occurred successively on a time scale of 5 ms were retained for a frame duration 
of, say, 100 ms, then it is more likely that it could be passed on to subsequent processing, such as 
attentive temporal judgment and verbal reporting processes. I would suggest, then, that the frame 
hypothesis requires a definition in terms of updating frequency, and that information within a 
single frame may be unchanging over the duration of that frame but does include specifications 
of change, nonsimultaneity, temporal order, and duration. 
 In addition, temporal discrimination thresholds vary over a very wide temporal range, and 
are affected by many factors. A comprehensive survey of that research is outside the scope of 
this paper (White, 2018), but a few brief observations will suffice for present purposes. Although 
nonsimultaneity judgment threshold can be less than 2 ms (Elhilali et al., 2009; Miyazaki et al., 
2016; Zera & Green, 1993), thresholds in the region of 40 - 60 ms have been reported in other 
studies (Axelrod, Thompson, & Cohen, 1968; Elliott, Shi, & Sürer, 2007; Geffen, Rosa, & 
Discrete temporal frames 
66 
Luciano, 2000; Kristofferson, 1967a). Thresholds for temporal order judgments, which differ 
from nonsimultaneity judgment in that participants must report the correct order of the stimuli, 
can be less than 5 ms (Babkoff & Sutton, 1963; Westheimer & McKee, 1977), but can also be 
more than 100 ms (Fink, Ulbrich, Churan, & Wittmann, 2006; Fostick, Ben-Artzi, & Babkoff, 
2011; Nishikawa, Shimo, Wada, Hattori, & Kitazawa, 2015; Marks et al., 1982). Many factors 
have been shown to affect temporal discrimination thresholds, including duration and intensity of 
the stimulus (Babkoff & Fostick, 2013; Fostick & Babkoff, 2013; Schneider & Hamstra, 1999), 
stimulus rise time (Heinrich, de la Rosa, & Schneider, 2014), ISI (Fostick & Babkoff, 2013), 
stimulus type, such as clicks versus tones (Fink et al., 2006), synchronous or asynchronous 
presentation of a sub-threshold stimulus (Elliott et al., 2007), whether the arms are crossed or not 
(tactile stimuli, Heed & Azañón, 2014; Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 2001), age of participants (Lister 
& Roberts, 2005; Nishikawa et al., 2015), and mental health of participants (Nishikawa et al., 
2015). To take just one example, Fink et al. (2006) found that the threshold for detecting the 
temporal order of two different stimuli varied depending on stimulus properties, being 31 ms for 
tones differing in frequency, 58 ms for clicks differing in location, one being presented to each 
ear, 47 ms for identical visual stimuli at different locations, and 107 ms for stimuli at the same 
location with different colours. Finally, there is no obvious peak in reported temporal 
discrimination thresholds at any time span: thresholds are just spread over a wide range (White, 
2018). 
 It is clear, then, that temporal discrimination thresholds do not imply anything about 
discrete frames and their durations. Information about temporal discriminations, nonsimultaneity 
judgments, duration estimates, and so on, may be entered into a frame and held there for the 
duration of that frame (if not longer). But frame duration is not determined by temporal 
discrimination thresholds, and frames cannot be defined in terms of experienced simultaneity. It 
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is more likely that discrimination thresholds reflect local processing characteristics that have 
nothing to do with frames. For example, Fink et al. (2006) argued that frequency (for tones) and 
location are processed by low level neurons selective for direction of frequency modulation and 
for apparent motion, respectively, and differences in temporal discrimination thresholds reflect 
the specific operating characteristics of the different processes. I shall return to the hypothesis of 
local mechanisms after considering temporal integration. 
 
4.3: Temporal integration 
 
 In the most general sense, temporal integration covers any process that samples 
information across a period of time and generates some sort of unitary product. This can range 
from perceived brightness of a brief flash of light (Allan, Kristofferson, & Wiens, 1971; Stevens 
& Hall, 1966) to semantic interpretation of auditory speech input as a word (Hasson, Honey, & 
Chen, 2015; Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; Poeppel, 2003). Here too only a brief summary of 
research relevant to the discrete frame hypothesis will be given. 
 The main point is that durations of temporal integration vary across a wide range 
depending on many factors. There is no fixed time scale of temporal integration. Judged 
brightness of a flash of light depends, in part, on its duration, showing that perceived brightness 
emerges from summation of input information over time. Almost all of the summation occurs 
during the first 150 ms (Allan et al., 1971; Osaka, 1977; Stevens & Hall, 1966), but temporal 
integration for stimuli of low intrinsic brightness can cover about 300 ms (Aiba & Stevens, 
1964), and possibly may continue for as much as 1,000 ms (Raab, 1962). Thus, one could have a 
percept of a stimulus of given brightness persisting for 50 ms or for 150 ms, but that does not 
happen: instead, the percept is of a stimulus that is brighter when its objective duration is 150 ms 
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than when it is 50 ms. Something similar appears to be the case for perceived loudness of 
auditory stimuli, on a time scale of more than 200 ms under some conditions (Räsänen & Laine, 
2013; Rimmele et al., 2015; Zwislocki, 1969). Visual motion percepts involve summation or 
integration on a time scale of about 80 - 130 ms (McKee & Welch, 1985; Simpson, 1994; 
Snowden & Braddick, 1991), but under some conditions temporal integration for both biological 
and non-biological motion perception can occur on a time scale up to about 3,000 ms (Burr & 
Santoro, 2001; Neri, Morrone, & Burr, 1998). 
 I have already discussed the example of visual persistence, showing that the duration of 
visible persistence is not fixed but varies depending on both stimulus duration and motion 
properties (Di Lollo, 1980; Farrell, 1984), which represents a compromise between the 
processing objectives of feature analysis and minimisation of visual smear (Farrell, 1984). Thus, 
although integration into a unitary percept with experienced contemporaneity does occur, it does 
not occur on a fixed time scale. The time scale is flexible, in accordance with conflicting 
processing priorities. There is no functional advantage, and indeed some functional disadvantage, 
in having frames, even local frames, with fixed durations. There is evidence that the duration of 
integration for a unitary percept on any given occasion is set not by a fixed time but by 
information density (Lerner, Honey, Katkov, & Hasson, 2014). Given that both information 
density and the objective duration of meaningful units of information input vary (for speech, in 
the case of the study by Lerner et al., 2014), it would make better functional sense for processing 
to have a time scale that was both flexible and responsive to the temporal characteristics of the 
input. 
 Variability in summation or temporal integration times is due in part to noise in the 
stimulus (Burr & Santoro, 2001). This indicates that at least some temporal integration processes 
can be understood as involving signal detection or decision criterion thresholds: integration time 
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is flexible and the process stops, not after a fixed temporal interval, but when a signal has been 
detected or a decision criterion has been reached. Indeed, Räsänen and Laine (2013) argued that 
all products of perceptual processing involve temporal integration, even temporal discrimination, 
and that fine temporal discriminations just involve temporal integration over correspondingly 
brief intervals. Whether that is the case or not, it is clear from the research evidence that, not 
only is there no support for the occurrence of discrete frames, even local ones, of fixed duration, 
but such frames would be functionally inadequate, lacking the flexibility to deal with variations 
in stimulus conditions such as signal-to-noise ratio. 
 Research has shown, therefore, that temporal integration occurs on multiple time scales, 
and that variations in percepts are consistent with continuous processing and not with the 
stepwise functions that would be expected if updating were periodic. If discrete frames occur, 
they must have durations that vary as a function of many factors including signal detection, 
decision criteria, information density (Lerner et al., 2014), flexibility in the face of processing 
priorities (Farrell, 1984), stimulus luminance (Efron & Lee, 1971), and others. 
 This discussion has so far been concerned just with temporal integration within 
modalities. Perceptual information is integrated across modalities, and there is therefore a need 
to synchronise products of perceptual processes that have different latencies. Several studies 
have shown that the maximum window of cross-modal synchronisation is about 200 - 250 ms, 
meaning that events separated by that amount can be integrated into a synchronous percept 
(Conrey & Pisoni, 2006; Diederich & Colonius, 2015; Dixon & Spitz, 1980; Mégevand, 
Molholm, Nayak, & Foxe, 2013; van Wassenhove, Grant, & Poeppel, 2007; Wallace & 
Stevenson, 2014), but what, if anything, does that imply for the frame hypothesis? The temporal 
window of integration is not itself a frame of conscious perception. It concerns the integration of 
perceptual products that emerge with different latencies, registering them as simultaneous (or 
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not). Updating of the synchronised information could take place on any time scale and is not 
related to the question of how far apart in time two perceptual products could be and still be 
integrated into a synchronous percept. 
 However, if there are discrete frames of perception, the evidence reviewed above 
indicates that the durations of those frames are likely to differ between modalities. In that case, 
the problem for the frame hypothesis is to explain how cross-modal synchronisation can occur 
when frames in different modalities have different durations. Suppose that there are frames with 
a consistent duration of 100 ms in vision, and frames with a consistent duration of 70 ms in 
audition. This means that temporal boundaries of frames in the two modalities would only rarely 
coincide, and it is not clear how cross-modal synchronisation would be accomplished. Is the 
content of a frame in audition, for example, synchronised to the frame in vision that was going 
on when the frame in audition started, or to the frame in vision that starts in the middle of the 
frame in audition? There is no research evidence that would suggest that cross-modal 
synchronisation occurs at the level of frames (Wallace & Stevenson, 2014). Synchronisation 
could be accomplished before frames are constructed, but that would seem to require that frames 
and their durations also be synchronised across modalities. In short, the frame hypothesis 
generates problems for explanatory accounts of cross-modal synchronisation that do not arise in 
the absence of frames. 
 
4.4: The need for informational connection between frames 
 
 If the information in a frame is unchanging over the duration of a frame, that would seem 
to be contrary to our experience of the world as continuous and smoothly flowing over time. The 
contradiction is not absolute, because the static frame may include information about temporal 
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features such as motion and temporal order. The problem lies just in the fact (if it is one) that 
frames happen one at a time. There would be one frame with unchanging content for (say) 100 
ms, which was then replaced by the next, and so on. This can be illustrated by the film analogy: 
as a new frame enters the shutter, so the previous frame exits and whatever was in it is no longer 
there. It is impossible to infer, from the contents of the current frame, what the contents of the 
previous frame were. They might be similar or they might be completely different (because of a 
cut in the editing). The outcome would be that percepts are isolated in a perpetual present. This 
is, in effect, the rapid akinetopsia problem. 
 To circumvent that problem, experienced continuity in the perceptual world requires 
some form of connection between one frame and the next. Once a frame has gone, it is really in 
the past and really gone. Experienced continuity, connection of information between frames, 
requires preservation of some of the information that had been in the previous frame. There 
could, for example, be some specification of how the information in the current frame differs 
from that in the previous one. Without that, conscious percepts would have the character of brief 
but static moments. Of course, some information is preserved: it moves on through an 
informational bottleneck to iconic time scale processing (Sligte et al., 2010; Sperling, 1960), and 
through another information bottleneck to working memory (Jacob, Breitmeyer, & Treviño, 
2013; Öğmen, Ekiz, Huynh, Bedell, & Tripathy, 2013). But more than mere preservation is 
required. There must be connection, to yield percepts of things going on. Early in the paper I 
mentioned Clay's (1882) observation that the current note of a tune is perceived in a context of 
its history, which involves informational connection on a time scale of seconds. That is a simple 
illustration of the way in which preserved information about the recent past informs and is 
integrated with current percepts. So, at the very least, information in a frame must incorporate 
and integrate information about the content of previous frames. If the information content of 
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successive frames is integrated, then it is questionable to what extent frames can be described as 
discrete. 
 
4.5: How is updating done? 
 
 Eriksen and Collins (1967) asked, "Does an arriving stimulation enter an ongoing 
psychological moment or is it stored and then represented in the succeeding moment?" (p. 484). 
Fifty years later, that question has not been answered, and it is hard to find any frame proposal 
that even addresses it. 
 I have argued that frames cannot be defined in terms of experienced simultaneity. 
Instead, it is likely that they would be defined in terms of the processes that update and maintain 
the information content of frames. Under that definition, for a frame to be discrete, updating 
must occur in a temporally co-ordinated way across the entire frame, rather than on a local, 
piecemeal basis: the whole information content of a frame is updated at one time, and that time 
marks the boundary between one frame and the next. To be clear, this does not necessarily mean 
that all of the information is rewritten from scratch: instead, it is quite possible that information 
remains as it is unless new information requires revision of it (Galletti & Fattori, 2003; 
Nortmann et al., 2015). But updating only occurs at temporal boundaries between frames. Within 
a frame, information is unchanging. 
 VanRullen (2016) wrote: "Discretization does not necessarily entail that events coming 
in-between two epochs are lost to perception, but rather that events that are processed too late for 
one snapshot should be deferred until the next" (p. 724). But if they are deferred, where are they 
held? The products of processes that emerge during the time span of the current frame must be 
stored in what may be characterised as a temporary storage buffer before being injected en masse 
Discrete temporal frames 
73 
into the next frame. Suppose that a frame lasts for ~100 ms. A product of a perceptual process 
may emerge after the frame has been in place for 1 ms, or after it has been in place for 99 ms. 
Different products emerge at different times. If the current frame is static, they cannot be put into 
it, so they must be held in a buffer until the next updating occurs. 
 No doubt a plausible mechanism for holding information prior to construction of the next 
frame could be developed, but the need for one is problematic. What does it mean to say that a 
product of a perceptual process has been generated when it is not yet in a frame? Is it conscious 
or not? It seems that it should not be, otherwise the concept of a discrete frame is fatally 
undermined. But what is the difference between information being held in a buffer prior to 
entering a frame, and information being in a frame? The information content is the same, so that 
cannot be used to distinguish the two things. And what is the difference, such that information is 
not conscious in the buffer but conscious in the frame? The discrete frame hypothesis requires 
that these questions be addressed. 
 
4.6: What would frames do for us? 
 
 If there are discrete frames of conscious perception, they must have some functional 
significance. One possibility is that, by preserving information on the time scale of a frame, 
accessibility to subsequent processes might be enhanced. If information that two stimuli 
separated by 5 ms were nonsimultaneous lasts only for as long as the stimuli themselves, it is 
likely to be lost before it can be transferred to subsequent stores where it is available for further 
processing. If it can be held for, say, 100 ms, then there is a better chance that it will be 
transferred to subsequent stores. That would certainly be an advantage. Information is likely to 
be lost before it exits from perceptual processing, partly because of the need for attentive 
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maintenance (Rensink, 2000) and partly because of the increasingly limited capacity of post-
perceptual stores (Jacob et al., 2013; Öğmen et al., 2013; Sligte et al., 2010; Sperling, 1960). 
Maintenance of information in conscious perception for the duration of a frame might not only 
increase the likelihood of its survival into subsequent stores, but also facilitate selection of 
information in accordance with processing priorities. There are at least two problems, however. 
 One problem is that there are obvious practical needs for perception to be as up-to-date as 
possible. If a product of a perceptual process emerges 1 ms after the current frame has been set 
up, it must wait in the storage buffer for almost the entire duration of the frame before it can 
enter the next frame and thereby become potentially available to subsequent processing. This 
would appear to be disadvantageous. 
 The other problem is that discrete frames of fixed duration are too inflexible. We have 
already seen that temporal integration and decision making processes operate on time scales that 
are dictated by considerations such as noise in the input, information density, and the operation 
of criteria for decision making. In the example of visible persistence, there is a flexible 
compromise between holding information for further analysis and minimising the smear that 
results from holding it (Farrell, 1984). The temporal inflexibility of discrete frames renders them 
less than optimal for processing purposes. 
 A case can be made that frame duration is not completely inflexible. As discussed earlier, 
Cecere et al. (2015) found that the temporal window for occurrence of the double flash illusion 
varied in accordance with effects of TMS on the oscillatory frequency of alpha. The authors 
suggested that "alpha oscillations might represent the temporal unit of visual processing that 
cyclically gates perception" (p. 231). If that interpretation is correct, then discrete frame duration 
is not completely inflexible. However, there is as yet no evidence for the degree of flexibility 
shown by results of studies on visible persistence (Farrell, 1984): Cecere et al. (2015) adjusted 
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alpha frequency by ±2 Hz, which is comparatively small. Also, it is possible to interpret the 
results of the study without recourse to the discrete frame hypothesis. I have already argued that 
the functional characteristics of temporal integration pose serious problems for the frame 
hypothesis (section 4.3), and will not repeat those arguments here. An argument specific to the 
study by Cecere et al. (2015) is that the two tones (and the illusory two flashes, when they occur) 
are perceived as temporally successive, whereas events falling within a single frame are 
supposed to be perceived as contemporaneous. Thus, alpha frequency might indicate a window 
of temporal integration, but the products of the integration process include information about 
temporal succession of events within a single window. This might point to the aforementioned 
need for frames to be defined in terms of updating frequency and not experienced simultaneity, 
but it might also point to an interpretation that does not call on frames at all. That interpretation 
could be any of the possible functions of alpha discussed earlier (section 3.3). 
 There is a growing body of evidence that EEG oscillation frequencies can be affected by 
experimental manipulations such as TMS and presentation of stimuli with fixed periodicity, and 
that the effects on oscillation frequency are associated with perceptual effects suggestive of an 
alteration to the time window of temporal integration (Cecere et al., 2015; Ronconi & Melcher, 
2017). But that evidence does not speak to the frame hypothesis, primarily because many kinds 
of temporal integration occur, each with their own (and flexible) temporal windows, on several 
different time scales (Ronconi et al., 2017). They generate specific perceptual products that are 
affected by the duration of the window of integration, but (i) those products are not temporal 
frames but specific perceptual features, such as one or two flashes, and (ii) they are local 
phenomena and do not entail an overall temporal co-ordination in conscious perception. 
Therefore, whether there are discrete frames or not, flexibility in temporal windows of 
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integration in association with variations in oscillatory frequencies does not constitute evidence 
about flexibility in duration of discrete frames. They are just different things. 
 A second possible function for discrete frames would be synchronisation of the output of 
perceptual processes. In the case of vision, there is abundant evidence that different features of 
objects have different processing latencies (Arnold, Clifford, & Wenderoth, 2001; Kang & Shevell, 
2012; Moutoussis, 2012; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997a, 1997b; Zeki, 2015). For example, the 
processing latency for colour has been found to be about 80 ms less than that for motion information 
(Moutoussis, 2012; Moutsoussis & Zeki, 1997a; Zeki, 2015). Products of individual feature 
analysers need to be integrated into a coherent percept of an individuated object, so it could be 
proposed that a discrete frame supports the synchronised representation of asynchronous products of 
feature analysers. 
 There are at least three problems for this as a function of discrete temporal frames. One is 
that, although there is evidence that gamma oscillations are functionally involved in visual feature 
binding, the functional characteristics of that activity do not involve constructing temporally discrete 
snapshots of the whole body of visual information. On the contrary, they involve segregating 
meaningful components of the body of information, such as figure and ground (Elliott & Du Bois, 
2017). As Elliott and Du Bois (2017) put it, "features coding an object may be coded by virtue of 
oscillatory firing at one particular phase, while all features defining 'ground' or the context of an 
object may be responded to by firing at other phases" (p. 2). There must still be integration of figure 
and ground information, presumably at a subsequent processing stage, but the evidence does not 
favour temporal frames as the vehicle of that integration. The second is that there are other 
hypotheses about the functional significance of gamma (see, for example, Poch, Campo, & Barnes, 
2014; Tallon-Baudry, 2012), and there is no more reason to associate gamma with discrete frames 
than there is for alpha. The third problem is that features of visual objects are not well synchronised. 
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The research, using stimulus presentations with rapidly alternating features, has consistently shown 
misbinding of object features. For example, as Kang and Shevell (2012) put it, "observers perceived 
at each moment a combination of color and orientation that never was presented to the eye" (p. 
A128). Discrete frames on a time scale of more than 80 ms provide an opportunity for objectively 
accurate synchronisation of perceived object features, but the evidence shows that the visual system 
has not taken that opportunity. 
 Frame-like properties in attentive processing subserve useful functions, such as oscillating 
between the competing requirements of maintenance and updating of perceptual information. 
However, as we have seen, those functions do not require conscious perception itself to be 
composed of discrete temporal frames. There is, therefore, a need for the functional significance of 
discrete frames in conscious perception to be elucidated, that has yet to be satisfied. 
 
5: Conclusion 
 
 The hypothesis of discrete frames in conscious perception has not been falsified. It is 
very unlikely, in the current state of evidence, that there could be discrete frames encompassing 
the whole of conscious perception, or that there could be discrete frames encompassing an entire 
modality. Hypotheses concerning frames on a more local scale, such as specific kinds of 
perceptual processes, would be harder to falsify. However, the prospects are not encouraging. 
There is some disconfirmatory evidence, at least in the visual modality (Di Lollo & Wilson, 
1978; Efron & Lee, 1971); there is no unambiguously supportive evidence, and indeed there 
seems to be conflict between bodies of evidence for periodicity on different time scales; there is 
as yet no plausible or adequately specified mechanism that would generate discrete frames in 
conscious perception, as opposed to periodic fluctuations in processes within perceptual 
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processing prior to the emergence of conscious percepts; there is evidence that time scales of 
processes such as temporal integration and retention of visual information are flexible in 
response to processing priorities and decision criteria in signal detection processes, whereas 
discrete frames have a relative inflexibility that would render them ill-suited to the dynamically 
changing requirements of processing; and there are serious problems concerning the definition of 
frames, the need for informational connections between frames, the means by which boundaries 
between frames are established, and the apparent requirement for a storage buffer for information 
awaiting entry to the next frame, that have not been satisfactorily addressed. 
 As a final problem, it is not even clear what sort of evidence would demonstrate the 
occurrence of discrete frames. At longer time scales, in White (2017a) I discussed a study by 
Fairhall, Albi, and Melcher (2014). They scrambled film clips on time scales from 800 to 12800 
ms, and found a sharp increase in reported difficulty of comprehending the clips when the 
scrambling duration exceeded 2000 - 3200 ms. I argued that this was the right kind of evidence 
to be seeking for a frame in the region of 3 s, and I suspect that something similar might be the 
case for a hypothetical frame on the millisecond time scale. If a frame means anything, it surely 
must relate to integration and co-ordination of information. Thus, if a temporal stream of input 
information is scrambled on time scales ranging from, say, 30 ms to 200 ms, there should be a 
sharp increase in problems in perception when the time scale of scrambling exceeds that of a 
single frame. 
 Although no such research appears to have been carried out, there is at least one study 
that might have some relevance. Chait et al. (2015), studying speech perception, found evidence 
for two temporal windows of integration, on time scales of 20 - 50 ms and 150 - 300 ms. These 
probably have functional significance in relation to the time scales of organisation of 
linguistically meaningful information in speech. However, that functional significance alone 
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would suggest that those time scales are specific to speech processing and might not occur in 
other areas of perceptual processing. Nor is it clear that they give rise to discrete frames of 
conscious perception. On the contrary, they appear to be two time scales of activity that 
contribute to the synthesis of longer semantic units such as phonemes and words, which are then 
experienced as temporally unitary. As Chait et al. (2015) expressed it, "[s]ignals are concurrently 
analyzed on at least two separate time scales, the intermediate representations of these analyses 
are integrated, and the resulting bound percept has significant consequences for speech 
intelligibility" (p. 1). 
 In short, there are probably multiple time scales of integration of perceptual information, 
the time scales vary depending on the kind of stimulus input that is being handled, and probably 
depending on other factors such as competing processing priorities. Even then, the perceptual 
products of those processes do not proceed in discrete frames with any particular periodicity. 
Moreover, compiling information into frames that are updated on a scale of an appreciable 
fraction of a second would seem to entail cost in relation to (i) sensitivity to fine temporal 
structure, (ii) keeping information as up-to-date as possible, given the unavoidable latencies in 
perceptual processing, and (iii) flexibility to processing considerations such as information 
density. Making a convincing case for any kind of discrete temporal frame in conscious 
perception would appear to be quite a challenge. 
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Footnotes 
 
 1. Some authors have also taken an analogy with successive snapshots taken by a 
camera (Blais, Arguin, & Gosselin, 2013; VanRullen & Koch, 2003). This seems less 
appropriate because there is nothing to connect successive snapshots to generate an illusion 
of continuity in perceptual experience. 
 2. Brief accounts of what von Baer might have said can be found in Pöppel (2009) 
and Elliott and Giersch (2016). 
 3. Not having access to the original, I am indebted to Durgin and Sternberg (2002) for 
this information; see also Lloyd (2012). 
 4. VanRullen et al. (2011) reported one study apparently showing such an effect in 
connection with alpha rhythm (7 - 13 Hz) by Varela, Toro, John, and Schwartz (1981), but 
they also reported that attempts to replicate that result by themselves and others had failed. 
Here I focus on the recent successful studies. 
 5. It is not mentioned in the extensive review by Bazanova and Vernon (2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discrete temporal frames 
81 
 
References 
 
 1. Aiba, T. S., & Stevens, S. S. (1964). Relation of brightness to duration and luminance 
under light- and dark-adaptation. Vision Research, 4, 391-401. 
 2. Allan, L. G., Kristofferson, A. B., & Wiens, E. W. (1971). Duration discrimination of 
brief flashes. Perception and Psychophysics, 9, 327-334. 
 3. Allport, D. A. (1968). Phenomenal simultaneity and the perceptual moment 
hypothesis. British Journal of Psychology, 59, 395-406. 
 4. Andrews, T. J., White, L. E., Binder, D., & Purves, D. (1996). Temporal events in 
cyclopean vision. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of America, 93, 3689-3692. 
 5. Ansbacher, H. L. (1944). Distortion in the perception of real movement. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 34, 1-23. 
 6. Anstis, S., Stürzel, F., & Spillmann, L. (1999). Spatial distortions in rotating radial 
figures. Vision Research, 39, 1455-1463. 
 7. Arnold, D. H., Clifford, C. W. G., & Wenderoth, P. (2001). Asynchronous processing 
in vision: color leads motion. Current Biology, 11, 596-600. 
 8. Arnold, D. H., Pearce, S. L., & Marinovic, W. (2014). Illusory motion reversals and 
feature tracking analyses of movement. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
& Performance, 40, 938-947. 
 9. Axelrod, S. E., Thompson, L. W., & Cohen, L. D. (1968). Effects of senescence on the 
temporal resolution of somesthetic stimuli presented to one hand or both. Journal of 
Gerontology, 23, 191-195. 
Discrete temporal frames 
82 
 10. Babkoff, H., & Fostick, L. (2013). The role of tone duration in dichotic temporal 
order judgment. Attention, Perception and Psychophysics, 75, 654-660. 
 11. Babkoff, H., & Sutton, S. (1963). Perception of temporal order and loudness 
judgments for dichotic clicks. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 35, 574-577. 
 12. Barlow, J. S. (1960). Rhythmic activity induced by photic stimulation in relation to 
intrinsic alpha activity of the brain in man. Electroencephalography and Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 12, 317-326. 
 13. Baumgarten, T. J., Schnitzler, A., & Lange, J. (2016). Beta oscillations define 
discrete perceptual cycles in the somatosensory domain. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of America, 112, 12187-12192. 
 14. Bazanova, O. M., & Vernon, D. (2014). Interpreting EEG alpha activity. 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 44, 94-110. 
 15. Bechtereva, N. P., & Zontov, V. V. (1962). The relationship between certain forms of 
potentials and the variations in brain excitability (based on EEG recorded during photic stimuli 
triggered by rhythmic brain potentials). Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 
14, 320-330. 
 16. Bender, M. B., Feldman, M., & Sobin, A. J. (1968). Palinopsia. Brain, 91, 321-338. 
 17. Bertelson, P. (1966). Central intermittency twenty years later. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 18, 152-163. 
 18. Bishop, G. H. (1932). Cyclic changes in excitability of the optic pathway of the 
rabbit. American Journal of Physiology, 103, 213-224. 
 19. Blais, C., Arguin, M., & Gosselin, F. (2013). Human visual processing oscillates: 
evidence from a classification image technique. Cognition, 128, 353-362. 
Discrete temporal frames 
83 
 20. Blakemore, S.-J. (2003). Deluding the motor system. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 12, 647-655. 
 21. Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2002). Abnormalities in the 
awareness of action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 237-242. 
 22. Brecher, G. A. (1932). Die Entstehung und biologische Bedeutung der subjektiven 
Zeitenheit - des Moments [Emergence and biological significance of the subjective time unit - 
the moment]. Zeitschrift für vergleichende Physiologie, 18, 204-243. 
 23. Brenner, E., & Smeets, J. B. J. (2015). How people achieve their amazing temporal 
precision in interception. Journal of Vision, 15 (3), No. 8. 
 24. Broadbent, D. E., & Broadbent, M. H., (1987). From detection to identification: 
response to multiple targets in rapid serial visual presentation. Perception and Psychophysics, 
42, 105-113. 
 25. Buonomano, D. V., Bramen, J., & Khodadadifar, M. (2009). Influence of the 
interstimulus interval on temporal processing and learning: testing the state-dependent network 
model. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B, 364, 1865-1873. 
 26. Burr, D. C., & Santoro, L. (2001). Temporal integration of optic flow, measured by 
contrast and coherence thresholds. Vision Research, 41, 1891-1899. 
 27. Burr, D., & Thompson, P. (2011). Motion psychophysics: 1985-2010. Vision 
Research, 51, 1431-1456. 
 28. Busch, N. A., Dubois, J., & VanRullen, R. (2009). The phase of ongoing EEG 
oscillation predicts visual perception. Journal of Neuroscience, 29, 7869-7876. 
 29. Busch, N. A., & VanRullen, R. (2010). Spontaneous EEG oscillations reveal periodic 
sampling of visual attention. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of America, 107, 
16048-16053. 
Discrete temporal frames 
84 
 30. Callaway, E., & Layne, R. S. (1964). Interaction between the visual evoked response 
and two spontaneous biological rhythms: the EEG alpha cycle and the cardiac arousal cycle. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 112, 421-431. 
 31. Carmel, D., Saker, P., Rees, G., & Lavie, N. (2007). Perceptual load modulates 
conscious flicker perception. Journal of Vision, 7, (14), No. 14. 
 32. Carr, C. E. (1993). Processing of temporal information in the brain. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 16, 223-243. 
 33. Cecere, R., Rees, G., & Romei, V. (2015). Individual differences in alpha 
frequency drive crossmodal illusory perception. Current Biology, 25, 231-235. 
 34. Chait, M., Greenberg, S., Arai, T., Simon, J. Z., & Poeppel, D. (2015). Multi-time 
resolution analysis of speech: evidence from psychophysics. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 9, No. 
214. 
 35. Chakravarti, R., & VanRullen, R. (2012). Conscious updating is a rhythmic process. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of America, 109, 10599-10604. 
 36. Clay, E. R. (1882). The Alternative: A Study in Psychology (2nd Ed.). London: 
Macmillan. 
 37. Coltheart, M. (1980). Iconic memory and visible persistence. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 27, 183-228. 
 38. Conrey, B., & Pisoni, D. B. (2006). Auditory-visual speech perception and synchrony 
detection for speech and nonspeech signals. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 119, 
4065-4073. 
 39. Craig, A. D. (2009a). Emotional moments across time: a possible neural basis for 
time perception in the anterior insula. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B, 
364, 1933-1942. 
Discrete temporal frames 
85 
 40. Craig, A. D. (2009b). How do you feel - now? The anterior insula and human 
awareness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10, 59-70. 
 41. Craik, K. J. W. (1947). Theory of the human operator in control systems. British 
Journal of Psychology, 38, 56-61. 
 42. Crick, F., & Koch, C. (2003). A framework for consciousness. Nature 
Neuroscience, 6, 119-126. 
 43. Curran, S., & Wattis, J. P. (1998). Critical flicker fusion: a useful research tool in 
patients with Alzheimer's Disease. Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical and Experimantal, 13, 
337-355. 
 44. Deary, I. J., Simonotto, E., Meyer, M., Marshall, A., Marshall, I., Goddard, N., & 
Wardlaw, J. M. (2004). The functional anatomy of inspection time: an event-related fMRI study. 
Neuroimage, 22, 1466-1479. 
 45. Dehaene, S. (1993). Temporal oscillations in human perception. Psychological 
Science, 4, 264-270. 
 46. Diederich, A., & Colonius, H. (2015). The time window of multisensory integration: 
relating reaction times and judgments of temporal order. Psychological Review, 122, 232-241. 
 47. Di Lollo, V. (1977). Temporal characteristics of iconic memory. Nature, 267, 241-
243. 
 48. Di Lollo, V. (1980). Temporal integration in visual memory. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 109, 75-97. 
 49. Dixon, N. F., & Spitz, L. (1980). The detection of auditory visual desynchrony. 
Perception, 9, 719-721. 
 50. Dixon, P., & Di Lollo, V. (1994). Beyond visible persistence: an alternative account 
of temporal integration and segregation in visual processing. Cognitive Psychology, 26, 33-63. 
Discrete temporal frames 
86 
 51. Doesburg, S. M., Roggeveen, A. B., Kitajo, K., & Ward, L. M. (2008). Large-scale 
gamma-band phase synchronization and selective attention. Cerebral Cortex, 18, 386-396. 
 52. Drewes, J., & VanRullen, R. (2011). This is the rhythm of your eyes: the phase of 
ongoing electroencephalogram oscillations modulates saccadic reaction time. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 31, 4698-4708. 
 53. Dubois, J., & VanRullen, R. (2011). Visual trails: do the doors of perception open 
periodically? Plos Biology, 9, (5), e1001056. 
 54. Durgin, F. H., & Sternberg, S. (2002). The time of consciousness and vice versa. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 11, 284-290. 
 55. Durgin, F. H., Tripathy, S. P., & Levi, D. M. (1995). On the filling in of the visual 
blind spot: some rules of thumb. Perception, 24, 827-840. 
 56. Dux, P. E., & Marois, R. (2009). The attentional blink: a review of data and theory. 
Attention, Perception, and Psychophysics, 71, 1683-1700. 
 57. Efron, R. (1970a). The relationship between the duration of a stimulus and the 
duration of a perception. Neuropsychologia, 8, 37-55. 
 58. Efron, R. (1970b). The minimum duration of a perception. Neuropsychologia, 8, 57-
63. 
 59. Efron, R., & Lee, D. N. (1971). The visual persistence of a moving stroboscopically 
illuminated object. American Journal of Psychology, 84, 365-375. 
 60. Elhilali, M., Ma, L., Micheyi, C., Oxenham, A. J., & Shamma, S. A. (2009). 
Temporal coherence in the perceptual organization and cortical representation of auditory 
scenes. Neuron, 61, 317-329. 
 61. Ellingson, R. J. (1956). Brain waves and problems of psychology. Psychological 
Bulletin, 53, 1-34. 
Discrete temporal frames 
87 
 62. Elliott, M. A., & Du Bois, N. (2017). Dynamic constants and time universals: a first 
step toward a metrical definition of ordered and abnormal cognition. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 
No. 332. 
 63. Elliott, M. A., & Giersch, A. (2016). What happens in a moment. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 6, No. 1905. 
 64. Elliott, M. A., Shi, Z., & Sürer, F. (2007). The effects of subthreshold synchrony on 
the perception of simultaneity. Psychological Research, 71, 687-693. 
 65. Eriksen, C. W., & Collins, J. F. (1967). Some temporal characteristics of visual 
pattern perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 74, 476-484. 
 66. Fairhall, S. L., Albi, A., & Melcher, D. (2014). Temporal integration windows for 
naturalistic visual sequences. Plos One, 9, e102248. 
 67. Farrell, J. (1984). Visible persistence of moving objects. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 10, 502-511. 
 68. Fink, M., Ulbrich, P., Churan, J., & Wittmann, M. (2006). Stimulus-dependent 
processing of temporal order. Behavioral Processes, 71, 344-352. 
 69. Fiorani, M., de Oliveira, L., Volchan, E., Pessoa, L., Gattass, R., & Rocha-Miranda, 
C. E. (2003). Completion through a permanent scotoma: fast interpolation across the blind spot 
and the processing of occlusion. In L. Pessoa & P. De Weerd (Eds.), Filling-in: From Perceptual 
Completion to Cortical Reorganization (pp 177-186). Oxford University Press. 
 70. Fostick, L., & Babkoff, H. (2013). Different response patterns between auditory 
spectral and spatial temporal order judgment (TOJ). Experimental Psychology, 60, 432-443. 
 71. Fostick, L., Ben-Artzi, E., & Babkoff, H. (2011). Stimulus-onset asynchrony as the 
main cue in temporal order judgment. Audiology Research, 1, e5. 
Discrete temporal frames 
88 
 72. Fourneret, P., & Jeannerod, M. (1998). Limited conscious monitoring of motor 
performance in normal subjects. Neuropsychologia, 36, 1133-1140. 
 73. Freeman, W. J. (2004). Origin, structure, and role of background EEG activity. Part 
1. Analytic amplitude. Clinical Neurophysiology, 115, 2077-2088. 
 74. Freeman, W. J. (2006). A cinematographic hypothesis of cortical dynamics in 
perception. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 60, 149-161. 
 75. Gamache, P.-L., & Grondin, S. (2010). Sensory-specific clock components and 
memory mechanisms: investigation with parallel timing. European Journal of Neuroscience, 31, 
1908-1914. 
 76. Geffen, G., Rosa, V., & Luciano, M. (2000). Effects of preferred hand and sex on the 
perception of tactile simultaneity. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 22, 
219-231. 
 77. Geissler, H.-G., & Kompass, R. (2001). Temporal constraints on binding? Evidence 
from quantal state transitions in perception. Visual Cognition, 8, 679-696. 
 78. Geissler, H.-G., Schebera, F.-U., & Kompass, R. (1999). Ultra-precise quantal 
timing: evidence from simultaneity thresholds in long-range apparent movement. Perception and 
Psychophysics, 61, 707-726. 
 79. Georgeson, M. A., & Georgeson, J. M. (1985). On seeing temporal gaps between 
gratings: a criterion problem for measurement of visible persistence. Vision Research, 25, 1729-
1733. 
 80. Geremek, A., Stürzel, F., da Pos, O., & Spillmann, L. (2002). Masking, persistence, 
and transfer in rotating arcs. Vision Research, 42, 2509-2519. 
 81. Gersztenkorn, D., & Lee, A. G. (2015). Palinopsia revamped: a systematic review of 
the literature. Survey of Ophthalmology, 60, 1-35. 
Discrete temporal frames 
89 
 82. Giraud, A.-L., & Poeppel, D. (2012). Cortical oscillations and speech processing: 
emerging computational principles and operations. Nature Neuroscience, 15, 511-517. 
 83. Gleiss, S., & Kayser, C. (2013). Oscillatory mechanisms underlying the enhancement 
of visual motion perception by multisensory congruency. Neuropsychologia, 53, 84-93. 
 84. Goel, A., & Buonoamno, D. V. (2014). Timing as an intrinsic property of neural 
networks: evidence from in vivo and in vitro experiments. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society: B, 369: 20120460. 
 85. Gorea, A. (2011). Ticks per thought or thoughts per tick? A selective review of time 
perception with hints on future research. Journal of Physiology - Paris, 105, 153-163. 
 86. Grothe, B. (2003). New roles for synaptic inhibition in sound localization. Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 1-11. 
 87. Guski, R., & Troje, N. F. (2003). Audiovisual phenomenal causality. Perception 
and Psychophysics, 65, 789-800. 
 88. Haber, R. H. (1983). The impending demise of the icon: a critique of the concept of 
iconic storage in visual information processing. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6, 1+. 
 89. Haber, R. N., & Hershenson, M. (1973). The Psychology of Visual Perception. New 
York: Holt. 
 90. Hanslmayr, S., Gross, J., Klimesch, W., & Shapiro, K. L. (2011). The role of alpha 
oscillations in temporal attention. Brain Research Reviews, 67, 331-343. 
 91. Harter, M. R. (1967). Excitability cycles and cortical scanning: a review of two 
hypotheses of central intermittency in perception. Psychological Bulletin, 68, 47-58. 
 92. Harter, M. R., & White, C. T. (1968). Periodicity within reaction time distributions 
and electromyograms. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 20, 157-166. 
Discrete temporal frames 
90 
 93. Hasson, U., Chen, J., & Honey, C. J. (2015). Hierarchical process memory: memory 
as an integral component of information processing. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19, 304-313. 
 94. Heed, T., & Azañón, E. (2014). Using time to investigate space: a review of tactile 
temporal order judgments as a window onto spatial processing in touch. Frontiers in Psychology, 
5, No. 76. 
 95. Heinrich, A., de la Rosa, S., & Schneider, B. A. (2014). The role of stimulus 
complexity, spectral overlap, and pitch for gap-detection thresholds in young and old listeners. 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 136, 1797-1807. 
 96. Heinrich, A., & Schneider, B. (2006). Age-related changes in within- and between-
channel gap detection using sinusoidal stimuli. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 
119, 2316-2326. 
 97. Henning, G. B., & Gaskell, H. (1981). Monaural phase sensitivity with Ronken's 
paradigm. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 70, 1669-1673. 
 98. Herzog, M. H., Kammer, T., & Scharnowski, F. (2016). Time slices: what is the 
duration of a percept? Plos Biology, 14, e1002433. 
 99. Hickok, G., & Poeppel, D. (2007). The cortical organization of speech processing. 
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 8, 393-402. 
 100. Hirsh, I. J., & Sherrick, C. E. (1961). Perceived order in different sense modalities. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 423-432. 
 101. Hogendoorn, H. (2016). Voluntary saccadic eye movements ride the attentional 
rhythm. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 28, 1625-1635. 
 102. Hogendoorn, H., Verstraten, F. A. J., & Johnston, A. (2010). Spatially localized 
time shifts of the perceptual stream. Frontiers in Psychology, 1, No. 181. 
Discrete temporal frames 
91 
 103. Hubbard, T. L. (2013a). Phenomenal causality I: varieties and variables. 
Axiomathes, 23, 1-42. 
 104. Hubbard, T. L. (2013b). Phenomenal causality II: integration and implication. 
Axiomathes, 23, 485-524. 
 105. Ihde-Scholl, T., & Jefferson, J. W. (2001). Mitrazapine-associated palinopsia. 
Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 62, 373. 
 106. Ilhan, B., & VanRullen, R. (2012). No counterpart of visual perceptual echoes in the 
auditory system. Plos One, 7, (11), e49287. 
 107. Ilhan, B., & VanRullen, R. (2012). No counterpart of visual perceptual echoes in the 
auditory system. Plos One, 7, (11), e49287. 
 108. Ilmberger, J. (1986). Auditory excitability cycles in choice reaction time and order 
threshold. Naturwissenschaften, 73, 743-744. 
 109. Jacob, J., Breitmeyer, B. G., & Treviño, M. (2013). Tracking the first two seconds: 
three stages of visual information processing? Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 20, 1114-1119. 
 110. James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. New York, NY: Holt. 
 111. Jensen, O., Bonnefond, M., & VanRullen, R. (2012). An oscillatory mechanism for 
prioritizing salient unattended stimuli. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16, 200-206. 
 112. Jensen, O., Gips, B., Bergmann, T. O., & Bonnefond, M. (2014). Temporal coding 
organized by coupled alpha and gamma oscillations prioritize visual processing. Trends in 
Neurosciences, 37, 357-369. 
 113. Jokeit, H. (1990). Analysis of periodicities in human reaction times. 
Naturwissenschaften, 77, 289-291. 
Discrete temporal frames 
92 
 114. Joliot, M., Ribary, U., & Llinas, R. (1994). Human oscillatory brain activity near 40 
Hz coexists with cognitive temporal binding. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of America, 91, 11748-11751. 
 115. Kanabus, M., Szeląg, E., Rojek, E., & Pöppel, E. (2002). Temporal order judgement 
for auditory and visual stimuli. Acta Neurobiologiae Experimentalis, 62, 263-270. 
 116. Kang, P., & Shevell, S. K. (2012). Feature binding of a continuously changing 
object. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 29, A128-A132. 
 117. Kilpatrick, Z. P., & Ermentrout, G. B. (2012). Hallucinogen persisting perception 
disorder in neuronal networks with adaptation. Journal of Computational Neuroscience, 32, 25-
53. 
 118. Klimesch, W. (2012). Alpha-band oscillations, attention, and controlled access to 
stored information. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16, 606-617. 
 119. Klimesch, W., Sauseng, P., & Hanslmayr, S. (2007). EEG alpha oscillations: the 
inhibition-timing hypothesis. Brain Research Reviews, 53, 63-88. 
 120. Kline, K. A., Holcombe, A. O., & Eagleman, D. M. (2004). Illusory motion reversal 
is caused by rivalry, not by perceptual snapshots of the visual field. Vision Research, 44, 2653-
2658. 
 121. Kline, K. A., Holcombe, A. O., & Eagleman, D. M. (2006). Illusory motion reversal 
does not imply discrete processing: reply. Vision Research, 46, 1158-1159. 
 122. Kösem, A., Basirat, A., Azizi, L., & van Wassenhove, V. (2016). High-frequency 
neural activity predicts word parsing in ambiguous speech streams. Journal of Neurophysiology, 
116, 2497-2512. 
Discrete temporal frames 
93 
 123. Kozma, R., & Freeman, W. J. (2017). Cinematic operation of the cerebral cortex 
interpreted via critical transitions in self-organized dynamic systems. Frontiers in Systems 
Neuroscience, 11, No. 10. 
 124. Kranczioch, C., Debener, S., Schwarzbach, J., Goebel, R., & Engel, A. K. (2005). 
Neural correlates of conscious perception in the attentional blink. Neuroimage, 24, 704-714. 
 125. Kristofferson, A. B. (1967a). Attention and psychological time. Acta Psychologica, 
27, 93-100. 
 126. Kristofferson, A. B. (1967b). Successiveness discrimination as a two-state, quantal 
process. Science, 158, 1337-1339. 
 127. Kristofferson, A. B. (1980). A quantal step function in duration discrimination. 
Perception and Psychophysics, 27, 300-306. 
 128. Kristofferson, A. B. (1984). Quantal and deterministic thinking in human duration 
discrimination. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 423, 3-15. 
 129. Lackner, J. R., & Teuber, H.-L. (1973). Alterations in auditory fusion thresholds 
after cerebral injury in man. Neuropsychologia, 11, 409-415. 
 130. Landau, A. N., & Fries, P. (2012). Attention samples stimuli rhythmically. Current 
Biology, 22, 1000-1004. 
 131. Lange, J., Keil, J., Schnitzler, A., van Dijk, H., & Weisz, N. (2014). The role of 
alpha oscillations for illusory perception. Behavioural Brain Research, 271, 294-301. 
 132. Latour, P. L. (1967). Evidence of internal clocks in the human operator. Acta 
Psychologica, 27, 341-348. 
 133. Lehmann, D. (1971). Multichannel topography of human alpha EEG fields. 
Electroencephalography & Clinical Neurophysiology, 31, 439-449. 
Discrete temporal frames 
94 
 134. Lehmann, D., Faber, P. L., Gianotti, L. R. R., Kochi, K., & Pascual-Marqui, R. D. 
(2006). Coherence and phase locking in the scalp EEG and between LORETA model sources, 
and microstates as putative mechanisms of brain temporo-spatial functional organization. 
Journal of Physiology - Paris, 99, 29-36. 
 135. Lehmann, D., Ozaki, H., & Pal, I. (1987). EEG alpha map series: brain micro-states 
by space-oriented adaptive segmentation. Electroencephalography and Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 67, 271-288. 
 136. Lerner, Y., Honey, C. J., Katkov, M., & Hasson, U. (2014). Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 111, 2433-2444. 
 137. Leshowitz, B. (1971). Measurement of the two-click threshold. Journal of the 
Acoustical Society of America, 49, 462-466. 
 138. Levichkina, E., Fedorov, G., & van Leeuwen, C. (2014). Spatial proximity rather 
than temporal frequency determines the wagon wheel illusion. Perception, 43, 295-315. 
 139. Lindsley, D. B. (1952). Psychological phenomena and the electroencephalogram. 
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 4, 443-456. 
 140. Lisman, J. E., & Jensen, O. (2013). The theta-gamma neural code. Neuron, 77, 
1002-1016. 
 141. Lister, J. J., & Roberts, R. A. (2005). Effects of age and hearing loss on gap 
detection and the precedence effect: narrow-band stimuli. Journal of Speech, Language and 
Hearing Research 48, 482-493. 
 142. Lloyd, D. (2012). Neural correlates of temporality: default mode variability and 
temporal awareness. Consciousness and Cognition, 21, 695-703. 
 143. Lotze, M., Wittmann, M., von Steinbüchel, N., Pöppel, E., & Roenneberg, T. 
(1999). Daily rhythm of temporal resolution in the auditory system. Cortex, 35, 89-100. 
Discrete temporal frames 
95 
 144. Macdonald, J. S. P., Cavanagh, P., & VanRullen, R. (2014). Attentional sampling of 
multiple wagon wheels. Attention, Perception, and Psychophysics, 76, 64-72. 
 145. Madler, C., & Pöppel, E. (1987). Auditory evoked potentials indicate the loss of 
neuronal oscillations during general anaesthesia. Natruwissenschaften, 74, 42-43. 
 146. Mai, G., Minett, J. W., & Wang, W. S.-Y. (2016). Delta, theta, beta, and gamma 
brain oscillations index levels of auditory sentence processing. Neuroimage, 133,516-528. 
 147. Marks, L. E., Girvin, J. P., O'Keefe, M. D., Ning, P., Quest, D. O., Antunes, J. L., & 
Dobelle, W. H. (1982). Electrocutaneous stimulation III. The perception of temporal order. 
Perception and Psychophysics, 32, 537-541. 
 148. Martens, S., & Wyble, B. (2010). The attentional blink: past, present, and future of a 
bind spot in perceptual awareness. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 34, 947-957. 
 149. Mathewson, K. E., Lleras, A., Beck, D. M., Fabiani, M., Ro, T., & Gratton, G. 
(2011). Pulsed out of awareness: EEG alpha oscillations represent a pulsed-inhibition of ongoing 
cortical processing. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, No. 99. 
 150. Matthews, W. J., & Grondin, S. (2012). On the replication of Kristofferson's (1980) 
quantal timing for duration discrimination: some learning but no quanta and not much of a 
Weber constant. Attention, Perception and Psychophysics, 74, 1056-1072. 
 151. Mauk, M. D., & Buonomano, D. V. (2004). The neural basis of temporal 
processing. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27, 307-340. 
 152. McComas, A. J., & Cupido, C. M. (1999). The RULER model. Is this how the 
somatosensory cortex works? Clinical Neurophysiology, 110, 1987-1994. 
 153. McKee, S. P., & Welch, L. (1985). Sequential recruitment in the discrimination of 
velocity. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, Optics and Image Science, 2, 243-251. 
Discrete temporal frames 
96 
 154. Mégevand, P., Molholm, S., Nayak, A., & Foxe, J. J. (2013). Recalibration of the 
multisensory temporal window of integration results from changing task demands. Plos One, 8, 
e71608. 
 155. Michotte, A. (1963). The Perception of Causality. New York: Basic Books. 
 156. Miconi, T., & VanRullen, R. (2010). The gamma slideshow: object-based 
perceptual cycles in a model of the visual cortex. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4, No. 205. 
 157. Miller, G. A., & Taylor, W. G. (1948). The perception of repeated bursts of noise. 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 20, 171-182. 
 158. Milton, A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2016). The phase of pre-stimulus alpha 
oscillations influences the visual perception of stimulus timing. Neuroimage, 133, 53-61. 
 159. Miyazaki, M., Kadota, H., Matsuzaki, K. S., Takeuchi, S., Sekiguchi, H., Aoyama, 
T., & Kochiyama, T. (2016). Dissociating the neural correlates of tactile temporal order and 
simultaneity judgements. Scientific Reports, 6, No. 23323. 
 160. Moutoussis, K., & Zeki, S. (1997a). A direct demonstration of perceptual 
asynchrony in vision. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 264, 
393-399.  
 161. Moutoussis, K., & Zeki, S. (1997b). Functional segregation and temporal hierarchy 
of the visual perceptive systems. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological 
Sciences, 264, 1407-1414. 
 162. Myers, N. E., Stokes, M. G., Walther, L., & Nobre, A. C. (2014). Oscillatory brain 
state predicts variability in working memory. Journal of Neuroscience, 34, 7735-7743. 
 163. Näätänen, R., & Winkler, I. (1999). The concept of auditory stimulus representation 
in cognitive neuroscience. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 826-859. 
Discrete temporal frames 
97 
 164. Neri, P., Morrone, M. C., & Burr, D. C. (1998). Seeing biological motion. Nature, 
395, 894-896. 
 165. Nishikawa, N., Shimo, Y., Wada, M., Hattori, N., & Kitazawa, S. (2015). Effects of 
aging and idiopathic Parkinson's Disease on tactile temporal order judgment. Plos One, 10, (3), 
e0118331. 
 166. Nortmann, N., Rekauzke, S., Onat, S., König, P., & Jancke, D. (2015). Primary 
visual cortex represents the difference between past and present. Cerebral Cortex, 25, 1427-
1440. 
 167. Öğmen, H., Ekiz, O, Huynh, D., Bedell, H. E., & Tripathy, S. P. (2013). Bottlenecks 
of motion processing during a visual glance: the leaky flask model. Plos One, 8, e83671. 
 168. Ortiz-Mantilla, S., Hämäläinen, J. A., Realpe-Bonilla, T., & Benasich, A. A. (2016). 
Oscillatory dynamics underlying perceptual narrowing of native phoneme mapping from 6 to 12 
months of age. Journal of Neuroscience, 36, 12095-12105. 
 169. Osaka, N. (1977). Perceived brightness as a function of flash duration in the 
peripheral visual field. Perception and Psychophysics, 22, 63-69. 
 170. Payne, L., & Sekuler, R. (2014). The importance of ignoring: alpha oscillations 
protect selectivity. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23,171-177. 
 171. Pichora-Fuller, M. K., Schneider, B. A., Benson, N. J., Hamstra, S. J., & Storzer, E. 
(2006). Effect of age of detection of gaps in speech and nonspeech markers varying in duration 
and spectral symmetry. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 119, 1143-1155. 
 172. Pitts, W., & McCulloch, W. S. (1947). How we know universals: the perception of 
auditory and visual forms. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 9, 127-147. 
Discrete temporal frames 
98 
 173. Poch, C., Campo, P., & Barnes, G. R. (2014). Modulation of alpha and gamma 
oscillations related to retrospectively orienting attention within working memory. European 
Journal of Neuroscience, 40, 2399-2405. 
 174. Pockett, S., Brennan, B. J., Bold, G. E. J., & Holmes, M. D. (2011). A possible 
physiological basis for the discontinuity of consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, No. 377. 
 175. Poeppel, D. (2003). The analysis of speech in different temporal integration 
windows: cerebral lateralization as 'asymmetric sampling in time'. Speech Communication, 41, 
245-255. 
 176. Pöppel, E. (1970). Excitability cycles in central intermittency. Psychologische 
Forschung, 34, 1-9. 
 177. Pöppel, E. (1997). A hierarchical model of temporal perception. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 1, 56-61. 
 178. Pöppel, E. (2009). Pre-semantically defined temporal windows for cognitive 
processing. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B, 364, 1887-1896. 
 179. Pöppel, E., & Logothetis, N. (1986). Neuronal oscillations in the human brain. 
Naturwissenschaften, 73, 267-268. 
 180. Pöppel, E., Schill, K., & von Steinbüchel, N. (1990). Sensory integration within 
temporally neutral systems states: a hypothesis. Naturwissenschaften, 77, 89-91. 
 181. Powesland, P. F. (1959). The effect of practice upon the perception of causality. 
Canadian Journal of Psychology, 13, 155-168. 
 182. Purves, D., Paydarfar, J. A., & Andrews, T. J. (1996). The wagon wheel illusion in 
movies and reality. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of America, 93, 3693-
3697. 
Discrete temporal frames 
99 
 183. Raab, D. H. (1962). Magnitude estimation of the brightness of brief foveal stimuli. 
Science, 135, 42-43. 
 184. Räsänen, O., & Laine, U. K. (2013). Time-frequency integration characteristics of 
hearing are optimized for perception of speech-like acoustic patterns. Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America, 134, 407-419. 
 185. Raymond, J. E., Shapiro, K. L., & Arnell, K. M. (1992). Temporary suppression of 
visual processing in an RSVP task: an attentional blink? Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 18, 849-860. 
 186. Regan, D. (1992). Visual judgements and misjudgements in cricket and the art of 
flight. Perception, 21, 91-115. 
 187. Regan, D. (1997). Visual factors in hitting and catching. Journal of Sports Science, 
15, 533-558. 
 188. Reeves, A., & Sperling, G. (1986). Attention gating in short-term visual memory. 
Psychological Review, 93, 180-206. 
 189. Rensink, R. A. (2000). The dynamic representation of scenes. Visual Cognition, 7, 
17-42. 
 190. Rimmele, J. M., Sussman, E., & Poeppel, D. (2015). The role of temporal structure 
in the investigation of sensory memory: a healthy-aging perspective. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 95, 175-183. 
 191. Roberts, B. M., Hsieh, L.-T., & Ranganath, C. (2013). Oscillatory activity during 
maintenance of spatial and temporal information in working memory. Neuropsychologia, 51, 
349-357. 
Discrete temporal frames 
100 
 192. Ronconi, L., & Melcher, D. (2017). The role of oscillatory phase in determining the 
temporal organization of perception: evidence from sensory entrainment. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 37, 10636-10644. 
 193. Ronconi, L., Oosterhof, N. N., Bonmassar, C., & Melcher, D. (2017). Multiple 
oscillatory rhythms determine the temporal organization of perception. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of America, 114, 13435-13440. 
 194. Rosen, S. (1992). Temporal information is speech: acoustic, auditory, and linguistic 
aspects. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B, Biological Sciences, 336, 367-373. 
 195. Samaha, J., & Postle, B. R. (2015). The speed of alpha-band oscillations predicts 
the temporal resolution of visual perception. Current Biology, 25, 2985-2990. 
 196. Schlottmann, A., Ray, E., Mitchell, A., & Demetriou, N. (2006). Perceived 
social and physical causality in animated motions: spontaneous reports and ratings. Acta 
Psychologica, 123, 112-143. 
 197. Schmidt, M. W., & Kristofferson, A. B. (1963). Discrimination of 
successiveness: a test of a model of attention. Science, 139, 112-113. 
 198. Schneider, B. A., & Hamstra, S. J. (1999). Gap detection thresholds as a function of 
tonal duration for younger and older listeners. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 106, 
371-380. 
 199. Shallice, T. (1964). The detection of change and the perceptual moment hypothesis. 
British Journal of Statistical Psychology, 17, 113-135. 
 200. Simmons, J. A. (1973). The resolution of target range by echolocating bats. 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 54, 157-173. 
 201. Simmons, J. A. (1979). Perception of echo phase information in bat sonar. 
Science, 204, 36-38. 
Discrete temporal frames 
101 
 202. Simpson, W. A. (1994). Temporal summation of visual motion. Vision Research, 
34, 2547-2559. 
 203. Simpson, W. A., Shahani, U., & Manahilov, V. (2005). Illusory percepts of moving 
patterns due to discrete temporal sampling. Neuroscience Letters, 375, 23-27. 
 204. Sligte, I. G., Vandenbroucke, A. R. E., Scholte, H. S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2010). 
Detailed sensory memory, sloppy working memory. Frontiers in Psychology, 1, No. 175. 
 205. Smith, M. L., Gosselin, F., & Schyns, P. G. (2006). Perceptual moments of 
conscious visual experience inferred from oscillatory brain activity. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of America, 103, 5626-5631. 
 206. Snowden, R. J., & Braddick, O. J. (1991). The temporal integration and resolution 
of velocity signals. Vision Research, 31, 907-914. 
 207. Sperling, G. (1960). The information available in brief visual presentations. 
Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 74, No. 498. 
 208. Stevens, J. C., & Hall, J. W. (1966) Brightness and loudness as functions of stimulus 
duration. Perception and Psychophysics, 1, 319-327. 
 209. Stroud, J. M. (1949). Psychological moment in perception. In H. V. Forester 
(Ed.), Conference on Cybernetics (pp. 27-63). New Tork: Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation. 
 210. Stroud, J. M. (1956). The fine structure of psychological time. In H. Quastler (Ed.), 
Information Theory in Psychology (pp. 174-205). Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 
 211. Stroud, J. M. (1967). The fine structure of psychological time. Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences, 138, 623-631. 
 212. Strüber, D., & Herrmann, C. S. (2002). MEG alpha activity decrease reflects 
destabilization of multistable percepts. Cognitive Brain Research, 14, 370-382. 
Discrete temporal frames 
102 
 213. Sweet, A. L. (1953). Temporal discrimination by the human eye. American Journal 
of Psychology, 66, 185-198. 
 214. Tadin, D., Lappin, J. S., Blake, R., & Glasser, D. M. (2010). High temporal 
precision for perceiving event offsets. Vision Research, 50, 1966-1971. 
 215. Tallon-Baudry, C. (2012). On the neural mechanisms subserving consciousness and 
attention. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, No. 397. 
 216. Ulrich, R. (1987). Threshold models of temporal-order judgments evaluated by a 
ternary response task. Perception and Psychophysics, 42, 224-239. 
 217. Van De Ville, D., Britz, J., & Michel, C. M. (2010). EEG microstate sequences in 
healthy humans at rest reveal scale-free dynamics. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of America, 107, 18179-18184. 
 218. VanRullen. R. (2016). Perceptual cycles. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20, 723-735. 
 219. VanRullen, R., Busch, N. A., Drewes, J., & Dubois, J. (2011). Ongoing EEG phase 
as a trial-by-trial predictor of perceptual and attentional variability. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 
No. 60. 
 220. VanRullen, R., Carlson, T., & Cavanagh, P. (2007). The blinking spotlight of 
attention. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of America, 104, 19204-19209. 
 221. VanRullen, R., & Dubois, J. (2011). The psychophysics of brain rhythms. Frontiers 
in Psychology, 2, No. 203. 
 222. VanRullen, R., & Koch, C. (2003). Is perception discrete or continuous? Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 7, 207-213. 
 223. VanRullen, R., & Macdonald, J. S. P. (2012). Perceptual echoes at 10 Hz in the 
human brain. Current Biology, 22, 995-999. 
Discrete temporal frames 
103 
 224. VanRullen, R., Reddy, L., & Koch, C. (2005). Attention-driven discrete sampling of 
motion perception. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of America, 102, 5291-
5296.  
 225. VanRullen, R., Reddy, L., & Koch, C. (2006). The continuous wagon wheel illusion 
is associated with changes in electroencephalogram power at ~13 Hz. Journal of Neuroscience, 
26, 502-507. 
 226. VanRullen, R., Zoefel, B., & Ilhan, B. (2014). On the cyclic nature of perception in 
vision versus audition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B, Biological Sciences, 
369, 1-15. 
 227. Van Wassenhove, V., Grant, K. W., & Poeppel, D. (2007). Temporal window of 
integration in auditory-visual speech perception. Neuropsychologia, 45, 598-607. 
 228. Varela, F. J., Toro, A., John, E. R., & Schwartz, E. L. (1981). Perceptual framing 
and cortical alpha rhythm. Neuropsychologia, 19, 675-686. 
 229. Venables, P. H. (1960). Periodicity in reaction time. British Journal of Psychology, 
51, 37-43. 
 230. von Baer, K. E. (1862). Welche Auffassung der lebenden Natur ist die richtige? Und 
wie ist diese Auffassung auf die Entomologie anzuwenden? Aus baltischer Geistesarbeit: Reden 
und Aufsätze, 1, 1-47. 
 231. von Békésy, G. (1936). Über die Hörschwelle und Fühlgrenze langsamer 
sinusförmiger Luftdruckschwankungen [On thresholds for hearing and feeling of sinusoidal low-
frequency air pressure oscillations]. Annalen der Physik, 26, 554-556. 
 232. Vorberg, D., & Schwartz, W. (1987). Oscillatory mechanisms in human reaction 
times? Naturwissenschaften, 74, 446-447. 
Discrete temporal frames 
104 
 233. Vroon, P. A. (1970). Divisibility and retention of psychological time. Acta 
Psychologica, 32, 366-376. 
 234. Vroon, P. A. (1974). Is there a time quantum in duration experience? American 
Journal of Psychology, 87, 237-245.  
 235. Wallace, M. T., & Stevenson, R. A. (2014). The construct of the multisensory 
temporal binding window and its dysregulation in developmental disabilities. Neuropsychologia, 
64, 105-123. 
 236. Wallach, H., Newman, E. B., & Rosenzweig, M. R. (1949). The precedence effect 
in sound localization. American Journal of Psychology, 62, 315-336. 
 237. Walz, J. M., Goldman, R. I., Carapezza, M., Muraskin, J., Brown, T. R., & Sajda, P. 
(2015). Prestimulus EEG alpha oscillations modulate task-related fMRI BOLD responses to 
auditory stimuli. NeuroImage, 113, 153-163. 
 238. Wehrhahn, C., & Rapf, D. (1992). ON- and OFF-pathways form neural substrates 
for motion perception: psychophysical evidence. Journal of Neuroscience, 12, 2247-2250. 
 239. Weisz, N., Hartmann, T., Muller, N., Lorenz, I., & Obleser, J. (2011). Alpha 
rhythms in audition: cognitive and clinical perspectives. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, No. 73. 
 240. Welford, A. T. (1952). The "psychological refractory period" and the timing of 
high-speed performance - a review and a theory. British Journal of Psychology, 43, 2-19. 
 241. Westheimer, G., & McKee, S. P. (1977). Perception of temporal order in adjacent 
visual stimuli. Vision Research, 17, 887-892. 
 242. White, P. A. (1988). Causal processing: origins and development. Psychological 
Bulletin, 104, 36-52. 
 243. White, P.A. (2017a). The three-second "subjective present": a critical review and a 
new proposal. Psychological Bulletin, 143, 735-756. 
Discrete temporal frames 
105 
 244. White, P. A. (2017b). Visual impressions of causality. In M. Waldmann (Ed.), 
Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning (pp. 245-264). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 245. White, P. A. (2018). Temporal discrimination thresholds in perception in humans: a 
survey and some implications. Manuscript submitted for publication, Cardiff University. 
 246. Wiegrebe, L., & Krumbholz, K. (1999). Temporal resolution and temporal masking 
properties of transient stimuli: data and an auditory model. Journal of the Acoustical Society of 
America, 105, 2746-2756. 
 247. Wittmann, M. (2009). The inner experience of time. Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society: B, Biological Sciences, 364, 1955-1967. 
 248. Wittmann, M. (2011). Moments in time. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 5, 
No. 66. 
 249. Yamamoto, S., & Kitazawa, S. (2001). Reversal of subjective tempora order due to 
arm crossing. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 759-765. 
 250. Young, M. E., Rogers, E. T., & Beckmann, J. S. (2005). Causal impressions: 
predicting when, not just whether. Memory and Cognition, 33, 320-331. 
 251. Yun, S. H., Lavin, P. J., Schatz, M. P., & Lesser, R. L. (2015). Topiramate-induced 
palinopsia: a case series and review of the literature. Journal of Neuro-Ophthalmology, 35, 148-
151. 
 252. Zeki, S. (2015). A massively asynchronous, parallel brain. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society: B, 370, 20140174. 
 253. Zera, J., & Green, D. M. (1993). Detecting temporal onset and offset asynchrony 
in multicomponent complexes. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 93, 1038-1052. 
 254. Zihl, J., von Cramon, D., & Mai, N. (1983). Selective disturbance of movement 
vision after bilateral brain damage. Brain, 106, 313-340. 
Discrete temporal frames 
106 
 255. Zoefel, B., & Heil P. (2013). Detection of near-threshold sounds is independent of 
EEG phase in common frequency bands. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, No. 262. 
 256. Zoefel, B., & VanRullen, R. (2015). The role of high-level processes for oscillatory 
phase entrainment to speech sound. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 9, No. 651. 
 257. Zwislocki, J. J. (1969). Temporal summation of loudness: an analysis. Journal of the 
Acoustical Society of America, 46, 431-441. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discrete temporal frames 
107 
Table 1 
Contents 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1: Introduction: the hypothesis of discrete temporal frames in conscious perception 
 1.1: What is a frame of conscious perception? 
 1.2: Discrete frames and the subjective continuity of perceptual experience 
2: Early proposals 
 2.1: Frames in vision: Ansbacher (1944) 
 2.2: Cortical scanning and the psychological moment hypothesis 
 2.3: Cortical excitability 
 2.4: Central and perceptual intermittency 
 2.5: Overview of early proposals 
3: Recent proposals about discrete frames 
 3.1: Attention-based periodic sampling 
  3.1.1: The continuous wagon wheel illusion 
  3.1.2: EEG oscillations 
  3.1.3: "Perceptual echoes" 
  3.1.4: Other modalities 
  3.1.5: "Visual trails" 
  3.1.6: Overview of the attentive sampling hypothesis 
 3.2: The cinematic theory of cognition 
 3.3: A broader look at EEG evidence 
 3.4: Pre-semantically defined temporal windows 
 3.5: The time quantum model 
Discrete temporal frames 
108 
 3.6: Time chunks 
 3.7: Snapshots 
 3.8: The interoceptive specious moment 
4: General considerations 
 4.1: Evidence 
  4.1.2: Mechanisms for generating frames, and the periodicity issue 
  4.1.3: Disconfirmatory evidence 
 4.2: Temporal discrimination 
 4.3: Temporal integration 
 4.4: The need for informational connection between frames 
 4.5: How is updating done? 
 4.6: What would frames do for us? 
5: Conclusion 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discrete temporal frames 
109 
Table 2 
Hypothesized durations of discrete frames 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Duration (ms) Authors 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4.5 - 4.61 Geissler & Kompass (2001) 
12 - 15 Joliot et al. (1994) 
~30 Pöppel (1997, 2009) 
50 Kristofferson (1967) 
50 - 100 Pockett et al. (2011) 
50 - 100 VanRullen et al. (2005) 
50 - 200 Stroud (1949, 1956, 1967) 
50 - 200 Harter (1967) 
~80 Ansbacher (1944) 
~80 Macdonald et al. (2014) 
80 - 120 Lehmann et al. (1998) 
80 - 140 VanRullen et al. (2014) 
100 VanRullen & Macdonald (2012) 
100 - 200 Kozma & Freeman (2017) 
~125 Craig (2009a, 2009b) 
~140 VanRullen (2016) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note 1. Periodicities in multiples of 4.5/4.6 ms were also proposed, and an exact frame 
duration of 4.57 was proposed by Geissler et al. (1999). 
